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other guaranteeing Powers for armed assistance, Holland would be bound not to obstruct the rendering of such assistance. I think it could be argued with some effect that if in such circumstances a British naval force, or a military force escorted by ships of war, desired to enter the Scheldt for the purpose of succouring Antwerp, or for landing a field army, Holland would not be bound by the laws of neutrality to close the river against such an expedition.

Yet I doubt whether this view is so obvious as to be altogether incontrovertible. Holland might take a different view. In this she might well be influenced by Germany. Not that Germany could appeal with any force to the sanctity of the obligations of neutrality at a moment when she is herself engaged in violating the neutrality of Belgium. Germany would be likely to intimate very simply that if Holland did not bar the River Scheldt, her territory would be occupied by German troops. I shall recur to this aspect

of the question presently.

Before, however, doing so, it may be pointed out that the fortification of Flushing in itself need not imply any intention on the part of Holland to close the river to a force coming to the aid of Belgium in the defence of the latter's neutrality. Holland may have no desire at all to use the Flushing fortifications for that purpose, and may yet think it necessary that such fortifications should exist. They may be designed genuinely for the defence of Holland herself against attack, and for preventing the seizure of Flushing itself by any possible enemy. Even, therefore, if the argument in favour of the Scheldt remaining open for a force making for Antwerp were fully admitted, this would furnish no adequate ground for objecting to the fortification of Flushing.

On these points, involving as they do, important questions of international law, Sir Edward Grey may desire to have a legal opinion.

·

Apart from all this, the matter has a serious political aspect, and therefore requires looking at also from a general political point of view.

What, in the first instance, is the position of Holland? We have every reason to believe that she has received some sort of intimation from Germany that in case of an Anglo-German war, England may make an attempt to seize some Dutch ports. It is not very material whether Holland herself believes in the reality of this danger. It is certain that Germany believes it. Now it is Germany's interest that, in a war with England, she should have in Holland a neutral neighbour. This will secure to her the free entry of her commerce in neutral bottoms by Rotterdam and Amsterdam. It is also Holland's interest to remain neutral. Germany has evidently given Holland to understand that unless

• This is borne out, notwithstanding the repeated démentis of the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, by the statement made by his Excellency to His Majesty's Minister at The Hague on the 19th October, 1910, that-

"It was but natural that the German General Staff should take account of the state of the coast defences, and that the views which they held respecting the inadequate character of those defences should be known to his Government.”

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