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and the capture of the forts and strongholds are still to him of great importance regardless of their strategic value. In my opinion, the Turk would not march on until he had occupied these points; to capture them if properly defended will take time. To gain time must be ever a vital factor in any military operation with Great Britain, with her land forces, constituted as they are, may have to undertake.
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If it is allowed that El Arish and Nahkl, fortiñed and held by us, will force an invading commander to delay to capture these posts, or that if El Arish alone is held it will compel him to delay to capture it, or else to advance by the more difficult and circuitous route through Nahkl, then 1 consider that we should most certainly be in a position to occupy and hold the one or both of these places at a moment's notice. To enable us to do so their position and military characteristics must be carefully studied with a view to defence, the strength of the garrison necessary to hold them must be decided on, and they must be then deliberately and scientifically fortified. Personally, I am of opinion that both places should be fortified, and I say further that no scheme for the defence of the Canal can be effectual which does not deny as long as possible the use of El Arish to the invader.”
SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON said that to establish isolated posts in the desert would be an entirely new departure in our policy. He was not clear as to what troops should garrison these places, or on whom the cost of their defences and garrisons should fall. He did not think any confidence could be reposed in Egyptian troops in a war with Turkey, and British troops could not stand such places. He thought that a better means of denying the wells to the enemy would be to arrange for their rapid destruction on the outbreak of war. Ile did not think that the Turks would delay their advance to capture small posts. Apart from their German military advisers, many of their own officers were now highly trained. He thought that the further bank of the Suez Canal was probably the best line of defence. From the purely military point of view, he did not think 6,000 Turks could achieve very much in Lower Egypt. It was a very difficult country for military operations. There was no doubt, however, that an increase of the Army of Occupation was to be desired.
SIR ARTHUR NICOLSON said that in present circumstances any attempt to fortify and hold El Arish and to add to the small post at Nahkl would probably cause grave diplomatic difficulties. It might perhaps be possible to justify the construction of a road to Nahkl on account of the post stationed there. Any military operations in the vicinity of the Suez Canal would certainly constitute a breach of the Convention. The stringent provisions quoted at the top of p. 4 of the Paper under discussion (123-B) would certainly afford any Power in the slightest degree ill-disposed towards us a pretext for interference.
THE PRIME MINISTER called attention to the evidence given by Lord Cromer before Lord Morley's Sub-Committee in 1907 on the question of holding and fortifying Nahkl:-
This is a point of very considerable importance. I know the situation well; it is in the heart of the Sinai Peninsula. 1 believe it occupies a strategical position of some importance. I have not the least doubt that, from the purely military point of view, it may be desirable to occupy it. Unfortunately the military view often clashes with the political. In this particular case there is no financial question, as the force necessary to occupy Nahkl would be extremely trifling, but the political question involved is one of rather serious importance. I may be wrong, but I should think the Sultan would very strongly resent any fortification of the place, and it is not altogether unnatural that he should do so. In the first place, he is very sensitive about anything connected with the Hedjaz, and, rightly or wrongly, ho considers the peninsula as part of the Hedjaz. Of course geographically it is not. Then he thinks the Sinai Peninsula is Turkish, and that he ought to enter into possession of it. Although he gave in when the recent trouble occurred, I do not think in the least he has abandoned his claim. He would dislike any fortification also, because it would be almost avowedly against himself, and constructed by his own feudatory. I do not say that the idea ough to be abandoned, but I certainly recommend that nothing of the kind
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