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SIR ARTHUR WILSON said that it was undesirable to communicate our secret plans to the Dominions if there was any doubt as to what their attitude was likely to be on the outbreak of war. The prompt execution of the measures proposed by Lord Hardinge's Committee in the Dominion ports was of less importance than in Home ports, in as much as there was less chance of the ultimate escape of the enemy ships.
MR. CHURCHILL did not think that any of the amendments suggested for paragraph 3 of the report removed the difficulty, and he was inclined to doubt whether the measures proposed by Lord Hardinge's Sub-Committee were of sufficient importance to warrant the risk of raising this dangerous question.
MR. MCKENNA said that he feared that the addition of the words proposed by Sir William Nicholson would tempt the Dominions to tie up their fleets in local waters, which was exactly what the Admiralty most wished to avoid. The omission of paragraph 3 would not suffice, as the report contained an intimation that on the outbreak of war the Home Government would telegraph a direct order to the Dominion Governments to take definite hostile action against enemy ships, and this of course raised the same question of their liberty to abstain from taking part in the war. took the view that the enemy would not necessarily attack them; it was quite possible They that he would not; and they claimed accordingly the right to decide whether they would attack him or not. He did not think that there was any great importance or urgency in communicating the report to the Dominions. It could be sent to the naval Com- manders-in-Chief now, but he did not think the advantages to be gained by providing for the execution of the policy laid down by Lord Hardinge's Sub-Committee in Dominion ports was worth the risks we should run of raising this very awkward question.
LORD ESHER pointed out that the report made it clear that very careful arrangements were necessary if the policy laid down was to be carried out, and that it would be impossible to communicate full details of necessary action expected from them on the outbreak of war by telegraph. These arrangements required elaborate machinery, which must be set up beforehand. Improvised measures would certainly fail.
THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that the report with paragraph 3 omitted would be likely to invite enquiry, while its inclusion gave sanction to a doctrine which was not tenable in law without secession.
The action to be taken by the Dominions in carrying out the policy laid down by Lord Hardinge's Sub-Committee was especially important, for, as was shewn in paragraph 31 of the original report [C.1.D. paper 120-B] in the particular case of Germany, whereas on a given date there were German steam-vessels aggregating 67,000 tons in the ports of the United Kingdom, there were on the same date German steam vessels aggregating 80,000 tous in British ports oversea. their detention in port as proposed was not so much a naval question as one for the The arrangements for custom-house officers, assisted where necessary by the police or other forces.
He was a good deal impressed by the danger of leakage of information as to our secret plans for war.
A satisfactory solution of the matter was very difficult to discover. Perhaps the best course would be to try and make some opportunity to talk the matter over with the representatives of the Dominions, when they come, before taking any further steps. (Conclusion.)
It would be desirable to have a preliminary discussion of the subject with the representatives of the Dominions before taking further action.
3. AUSTRALIA: SCALE OF ATTACK. (C.I.D. Papers 69-C and 71-C.) MR. HARCOURT called attention to the correspondence in C.I.D. Paper 71-C. SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON took exception to paragraph 5 of the Memorandun of the Colonial Defence Committee embodied in C.I.D. Paper 69-C. There was a danger of the dogma therein laid down hindering the satisfactory development of local defence forces. It was admitted in paragraph 6 that in the early stages of a war the command of the more distant seas might rest with the enemy, but it did not seem
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