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or even allude to the subordinate status of the Dominion Governments in this respect at the forthcoming Imperial Conference. He explained that, thanks to an adroit avoidance on the part of the Admiralty representatives of this topic, an agreement of a highly satisfactory character had been reached regarding the co-operation of the Australian naval forces with the British navy in the event of war. The one thing which he thought the Self-Governing Dominions would not tolerate would be any suggestion of compulsion or coercion in such a matter. So long as the British Govern- ment were content to accept the technical “fiction" implied in the idea that the Dominions acted of their own free will in waging war, Mr. McKenna considered it was practically certain that they would always be ready to assist us. He added that the representatives of the Dominions were in reality under no delusion on the subject. They were completely aware of the irregularity, from the standpoint of international law, of the attitude they chose to take up. But they had deliberately adopted that attitude from considerations of political expediency, considerations which, in Mr. McKenna's opinion, were of paramount importance.
7. The Sub-Committee are of opinion that the question raised by these two opposing views is one of some importance. For on the one hand it is plain that, if the Dominion Governments seriously entertain the opinion that it is open to them to remain neutral, the consequences of this error may not only react unfavourably, upon defensive policy but may weaken the whole fabric of the Empire by raising doubts and dissensions in the Dominions at the most inopportune of all moments, that is to say, when war is actually in sight. The particular case of the enforcement of the policy (recommended by Lord Hardinge's Committee) of arresting enemy merchant shipping on the declaration of war may be cited as a case in point. Unless that policy is put in practice instantaneously on the outbreak of hostilities the enemy merchant shipping will escape, and all the elaborate arrangements made beforehand in peace time will be ineffective. But, unless and until the Dominion Governments have made up their minds to throw in their lot with Great Britain, the necessary action will not be taken. A delay of even a few hours would be fatal to the success of the operations.
8. On the other hand it is clearly very undesirable to arouse the resentment of the people of the Dominions by any needless insistence upon a state of things which they prefer to ignore, if, indeed, in many instances they are not genuinely ignorant of the political responsibilities inherent to their status as British subjects.
9. It is suggested that, so far as concerns C.I.D. Paper 124-B., the difficulty might be to a certain extent evaded by redrafting paragraph 3 in some such terms as the following
"It is desired at the outset to lay special stress on the fact that, although concurrence in the policy of His Majesty's Government involves peace preparations on the part of the Governments of the Dominions in connection with the treatment of enemy and neutral shipping on the outbreak of war, it will not in any way restrict the freedom of those Governments to decide, when the occasion arises, whether they will take action or not.”
This will not prejudice the main issue raised in this paper, as to whether the point raised by Sir Arthur Nicolson should be brought to the attention of the representatives of the Dominions at the Imperial Conference.
10. Minutes by Sir Arthur Nicolson and Mr. McKenna dealing with this question in greater detail are attached herewith.
C. L. O.
2, Whitehall Gardens,
February 28, 1911.
II.
MINUTE BY THE PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE,
FOREIGN OFFICE.
IF the Dominion Governments are informed that they were, in the event of war, at liberty to decide whether their naval and military forces should or should not participate in hostilities, they might be under the impression that this liberty connotes freedom of choice as to whether they themselves should become parties to the war.
&
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