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advanced bases may, in various phases of a war, be required in order to keep close touch with an enemy.
"In the event of war with the United States, Esquimalt could not, under present conditions, be used as a minor base of this description. Apart from its recognised vulnerability to attack by an expeditionary force, its close proximity to the naval base of Seattle, only 80 miles distant, would render it subject to continual attacks by torpedo craft, against which, in the present developed state of torpedo warfare, no effective provision could be made at any but prohibitive expense. A more northerly port, or even a natural anchorage, where a flying squadron could make itself temporarily secure against this form of attack, would be far more suitable for occupation as an advanced base, while naval operations were in progress in these waters, Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the main theatre of naval war with the Power named would be in the Atlantic, and it is there that the result would inevitably be decided. Canada would, therefore, be wise to concentrate her efforts on the defence of Halifax.
"4. The recent alteration in the balance of sea power in the Far East renders it improbable that naval raids would be directed against the Pacific Coast of Canada by Russia, as was feared in 1878 and 1885, and the raiding vessels of this or any Power other than the United States could now be dealt with in these remote waters by British warships operating under far more favourable conditions, even if no fortified base existed in these waters.
"5. Esquimalt is not a commercial harbour. In the future it is possible that Canada may possess a great commercial port on her Pacific sea-board, which may offer inducements to certain forms of attack, and require local protection by fixed defences; but this is not the case at preseut.
"6. To sum up, a permanent naval base is no longer required at Esquimalt for the fleet as at present distributed. Its defences protect no important local interest. In the event of war with the United States, it would be unsuitable for naval occupation as an advanced base owing to its exposure to the attack of modern torpedo craft, while, owing to its indefensibility against anything beyond the landing parties of one or two cruisers, would inevitably fall if that Power dispatched an expeditionary force against it.
In these circumstances, the Colonial Defence Committee recommend that Esquimalt be no longer retained as a fortified port."
Determination of Scale of probable Attack on Prince Rupert under Existing Conditions.
5. In the Colonial Defence Committee's Memorandum No. 417 M., dated the 7th July, 1910, on the principles of Imperial defence as affecting the oversea Dominions and Colonies it is stated as regards the general naval situation :—
"18. Of recent years, however, owing to the rise of the American and Japanese fleets based apon the Western Atlantic and Pacific, and to the entry of Germany into the ranks of first class naval Powers, the naval situation has undergone considerable change.
"The superiority of the British fleet over the fleets of the two strongest foreign naval Powers is, in the opinion of the Admiralty, still maintained. But, owing to the increase in the number of first class naval Powers, the strength of our naval forces, as compared with that of the naval forces of all the Powers in the world, has diminished; and it is possible that immediately on the outbreak of war the British fleet might not be supreme in all quarters of the world where the enemy's ships may be found.
"For example, in view of the great strength of the foreign squadrons now normally stationed within striking distance of the shores of the United Kingdom, a peace distribution of our fleets designed to meet a hostile combination of European naval Powers would not place our naval forces in a position immediately to assert their superiority over a hostile combination which included a Power based upon the Pacific or Western Atlantic. It is thus possible that, in the early stages of a war with a combination of naval Powers whose bases are far apart, the command of seas remote from our centres of naval strength might rest with the enemy.
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19. It must not, however, be inferred that operations of the enemy in waters where he temporarily possessed a local superiority would be as unhampered as if he possessed undisputed command of the sea. So long as our battle squadrons remained undefeated, the local superiority of the enemy would be of uncertain duration and liable to sudden extinction. This consideration would impose strict limitations upon the strategic employment of the enemy's fleets, and upon the nature and strength of the oversea attacks that he would be able to undertake on British territory
abroad."
As regards the conditions affecting the scale of oversea attack, it is explained in the same Memorandum that :-
“24. No general rule can be laid down for universal application regarding the period during which the local defences of British ports abroad may be called upon to sustain attack without naval support, or as to the nature and scale of the oversea attack to be provided against. The duration of the period will vary in the case of each place according to its proximity to the centres of naval power of the enemy and to the disposition of our fleets on the outbreak of war, Similarly, in endeavouring to assign a limit to the scale of probable oversea attack, it will be necessary to consider the case of each place separately, due regard being had to the value of the objective, to hydrographical and topographical conditions, and to considerations of distance, time, and relative naval and military strengths."
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