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CONSIDERATIONS of General Policy.
Vessels captured in such circumstances may be sequestrated or, on payment of com- pensation, requisitioned. The same rule applies to enemy cargoes on board such vessels.
21. In the case of war with Germany and Russia, however, the above regulations do not apply, as these Powers have expressly refused to be bound by Article 3. It follows that there is no obligation, in the event of a war with either of these Powers, to extend any leniency to enemy merchant-ships found at sea any time after the outbreak of hostilities, and it is well to remember that both these countries claim the right to sink enemy merchant-vessels as a general rule, grounding themselves on the absence of a sufficient number of conveniently situated national ports to which captured vessels could be taken as prizes.
22. The responsibility for dealing with enemy merchant-ships at sea
on the outbreak of war rests with the Navy, and the disposition of His Majesty's ships must at all times be dictated by considerations of naval strategy, over which the naval authorities must exercise exclusive and unfettered control. Subject to this paramount consideration, the Committee of Imperial Defence have placed on record their opinion that, so far as such a policy can be carried out without conflicting with the general plan of naval operations, it is desirable that as large a number of enemy merchant-ships as possible should be temporarily detained and brought into port immediately on the outbreak of war. The subsequent release of such of these vessels as were, at the moment of their capture, unaware of the opening of hostilities would be subject to the same reciprocal treatment as that extended to enemy merchant-vessels detained in British ports, and this principle of reciprocity, if generally applied, would also satis- factorily cover the case of German or Russian ships, to which special reference has been made in the preceding paragraph.
(D.)—Treatment of Neutral Merchant-vessels in Port on the outbreak of War.
23. The only questions of policy arising with regard to the treatment of neutral vessels in port on the outbreak of war, apart from the question of contraband, have reference to the exercise of the right of "arrêt de prince," and the diversion of any steamer services, which it might be imprudent to permit day by day to enter or approach closely any of our fortified harbours or naval bases.
and
24. Droit de Prince."-It may be important at the very outbreak of war, also at some particular later stage, to keep absolutely secret arrangements and preparations being made, in naval and commercial ports, or even inland, for military or naval purposes, which would be frustrated or adversely affected by untimely warnings reaching the enemy through direct or indirect channels. A strict and rapidly established censorship over telegraphic messages and printed publications is the natural safeguard to be adopted for this purpose. But in certain contingencies, notably in the case of operations partaking of the nature of a surprise, such measures would not suffice, if merchant-ships were allowed freely to depart from national ports and to carry and disseminate intelligence, whether conveyed by written or printed messages, or through the agency of passengers or crews.
25. The Admiralty therefore consider it imperative that the machinery should be in existence for preventing the sailings of all vessels, British as well as foreign, from national ports.
26. The temporary detention of neutral vessels in such circumstances as have been indicated is a right which has from time to time been exercised by belligerents, and which is known to international law as the "droit de prince." It must, however, be emphasized that the occasions on which the right has been resorted to are rare; that the detention has not usually been for more than short periods, nor enforced against more than a small number of vessels at a time; and that any unduly extended application to neutral shipping of exceptional measures not founded on any conventional agreement is always likely to provoke opposition and remonstrance in quarters where .t particularly desirable to cultivate a spirit of sympathy and friendliness. When exercised, the droit de prince" ought to be accompanied by the paya ent of liberal compensation.
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