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MR. HARCOURT thought that a clear presentment of the strategic aspect might perhaps have a useful educative effect on Colonial opinion.
MR. HALDANE said that the whole question turned on the question of the alliance. It was possible, however, without expense to push on such preparative work as plans and estimates so that if the need should arise the construction of the fixed defences considered necessary might be accelerated.
THE PRIME MINISTER stated that it is desirable that the policy in connection with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should be considered betimes. He was not certain that it would be expedient to discuss the question with the representatives of the Dominions at the approaching Imperial Conference. He conceived that to do so might
be inconvenient.
(Conclusion.)
The discussion was adjourned for further consideration of the Memorandum.
6. HOME DEFENCE: MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY THE ARMY COUNCIL FOR APPROVAL. (C.I.D. Paper 48-A.)
MR. HALDANE suggested that it would perhaps be better, in the first instance, to refer the War Office Memorandum to the Home Ports Defence Committee for scrutiny and for redrafting, if required.
THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that this was the best course. of the paper were perhaps rather controversial.
(Conclusion.)
Some portions
That the Memorandum on Home Defence be referred to the Home Ports Defence Committee.
२
7. THE DEFENCE OF ST. HELENA: MEMORANDUM BY THE ADMIRALTY. (C.I.D. Papers 55-C and 49-C.)
MR. HALDANE said that he did not dispute the desirability from the naval point of view of a garrison to man the existing guns and to protect the stock of coal which the Admiralty proposed to send there on the outbreak of war. There were also eleemosynary grounds for maintaining the garrison to which some weight had formerly been attached, but the matter was a serious one from the War Office point of view, as the cost of maintaining in peace the garrison which would be necessary to ensure the safety of the 5,000 tons of coal which the Admiralty propose to maintain there in war would amount to 56,000l. a-year. A garrison of some little strength was necessary, as besides Jamestown there were six other fairly easy landing-places and eight difficult ones. The compromise between the War Office and the Admiralty in 1906 did, of course, involve some slight risk, but he did not think that a case had been made out for disturbing the arrangement then agreed to, or for incurring the heavy expenditure involved.
SIR ARTHUR WILSON described the present arrangements under which only the guns were at St. Helena while the breech blocks, sights, and ammunition were in England as unsatisfactory. He did not agree that it was so easy to find other landing- places, and it must be remembered that an enemy cruiser could not spare many men for such enterprises.
All the Admiralty wanted was that the guns should be kept ready for use and with their proper complement of ammunition, and that there should be sufficient crews to keep them efficient. If this were done, it would be possible, with some local assistance, to hold the island until the war garrison arrived.
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