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SIR E. GREY said that the diplomatic consideration referred to in paragraph 15 did differentiate the case of Canada from that of Australia.
(Conclusion.)
The Memorandum should be redrafted, omitting all reference to the situation that might arise if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were determined, and should be confined to the probable Scale of Attack on Prince Rupert alone.
5. HONG KONG: STANDARD OF DEFENCES. (C.I.D. Paper 66–C.)
SIR JOHN FRENCH expressed the opinion that a force of considerably less strength than 14,000 men would serve to defend Hong Kong against the force which it was assumed the Japanese inight in certain eventualities bring against it. He had recently been all over the ground in the neighbourhood of Hong Kong, and had been much impressed by the difficulties that would have to be overcome by an attacking force. In arriving at a decision as regards the additions to the fixed defences it was important to remember that the design and construction of batteries took at least two years to complete, and it was therefore necessary that the work should be begun in ample time to ensure that the defences would be ready for use when the occasion for their need arose.
SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON said that should the Anglo-Japanese Alliance be terminated it would be necessary so to strengthen our naval forces in the Far East that they should be superior to those of Japan. Short of this, no additions would be of any use, for the Japanese fleet would be able either to destroy our fleet, or to confine it to Hong Kong, as they did the Russian fleet to Port Arthur.
SIR ARTHUR WILSON said that it would not be necessary for our naval forces in the Far East to be stronger than those of Japan at the outbreak of hostilities. All that was required was that we should have a naval force in the 'China Seas sufficient to deter the Japanese from bringing transports to the neighbourhood of Hong Kong, with a view to effect a landing in force. The Japanese would not attempt such an operation if their oversea communications were liable to be cut and their military operations interrupted The analogy of Port Arthur was not a true one. The Russian ships were not efficiently handled, and the hydrographical conditions at Hong Kong are very different from those at Port Arthur, where it took a whole day to move a fleet in or out of the harbour. What we need at Hong Kong is to secure it against capture by a coup de main. The farther away from Hong Kong the attacking force was compelled to land the longer it would take to achieve its object, and the greater the risk of the arrival of a land force superior to that of Japan. In order to compel a military expedition to land at a distance from Hong Kong the Admiralty intended shortly to dispatch a flotilla of submarines thither. He was further of opinion that the additions to the armament, as proposed by the Colonial Defence Committee, should be provided now with the object of deterring attacking ships from attempting to force an entrance to the inner waters.
SIR EDWARD GREY observed that this Memorandum raised the question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
As the alliance is terminable in August 1915, and as one year's warning must be given of an intention to denounce it, our policy in regard to the alliance must be considered in the near future.
The year 1912 may probably be a favourable time to enter into a discussion with Japan on the subject.
In papers which would be sent to the Premiers of the Dominions before the Imperial Conference, it might be desirable to impress upon them the serious effect that the denunciation of the Treaty would have on their strategic position, but there were other considerations which made it inexpedient for us to discuss the alliance with them. He was not aware whether the Governments of the Dominions had expressed any opinions as to the desirability of extending or determining the alliance.
LORD CREWE stated that in Australia public opinion was thoroughly hostile to the alliance, and, he believed, in New Zealand and Canada also, although to a less degree.
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