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2. CO-ORDINATION OF DEPARTMENTAL ACTION ON THE
OUTBREAK OF WAR. (C.L.D. Paper 121-B.)
THE PRIME MINISTER said that this was a most important matter, the consideration of which was already somewhat overdue. It could be discussed most suitably by the Standing Sub-Committee. There was, of course, no intention of weakening the responsibility of any of the Departments, and no question affecting naval or military plans or policy would come within the scope of the enquiry.
(Conclusion.)
That the question of the co-ordination of departmental action on the outbreak of war be examined into by the Standing Sub-Committee, with Sir Arthur Nicolson as Chairman, and representatives of the Departments concerned.
3. AUSTRALIA: SCALE OF ATTACK. (C.I.D. Paper 64-C.)
THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the principles enunciated in the Memorandum 64-C were substantially the same as the conclusions arrived at by the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1906, namely, that it is not reasonably probable that any military attack on Australia more formidable than a raid by a small landing force will be undertaken.
SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON deprecated the issue of the Memorandum to the Commonwealth Government in its present form as being likely to discourage them in the measures they were now taking to develop their military forces.
He pointed out that at the Imperial Conference on Defence in 1909, the necessity for the reorganisation of their military forces had been urged upon the Dominions, and that, as the consequence of Lord Kitchener's visit to Australia the Commonwealth Government were now taking steps to raise a large military force based upon universal liability to military service. If, as stated in the Memorandum, Australia could in no circumstances be exposed to the danger of attack more formidable than could be delivered by a small raiding force, it could not be maintained that a large military force was essential to the security of Australia. It seemed to him that this conception of the scale of attack against which Australia should prepare was based upon a naval situation which no longer existed. That situation had undergone profound modification in recent years. The British fleet is no longer supreme in all waters. In the Western Atlantic it is admitted that in certain eventualities we might not be able to assert our supremacy over the United States fleet in these waters for an indefinite period after an outbreak of war. The situation in the Pacific seemed to him. to be similar. If we should find ourselves involved in a war with Japan, the attitude of Germany being uncertain or hostile, we might be forced to maintain a fleet in European waters so strong that it was very doubtful if we should be in a position immediately to dispatch naval reinforcements to Far Eastern waters sufficient to enable us to assert our superiority over the fleet of Japan.
He therefore thought it highly desirable that the Commonwealth Government should be encouraged to develop their military organisation as a second line of defence to meet the contingency of the command of the Pacific resting for a time with the
enemy.
MR. HALDANE said that the Colonial Defence Committee had been asked to consider whether any change had occurred to modify the strategic situation of Australia since the Committee of Imperial Defence dealt with the subject in 1906. So far there had been no material change, and the Colonial Defence Committee's Memorandum reiterated the principles then laid down. He agreed, however, that a determination. of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would have far-reaching effects, and, as changes in the strategic situation would probably develop more rapidly than either military forces. could be organised or defence works constructed, it was desirable that the Common- wealth Government should be encouraged to proceed with measures required to meet a situation which might arise in a few years' time.
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