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(ii) That an additional armament of two 9-2-inch guns be provided. That a site be chosen on an elevated plateau known a Dragon's Back,” above Point d'Aguilar, for a battery to be armed with these guns.
I have personally reconnoitred the position, which is also well known to the military authorities of the island. A battery thus posted will command the southern approaches from the ses in a sufficient degree to oppose effectively transports supported by cruiser attempting to effect a landing. It will also be so situated as to cover by its fire the approach to the outer eastern entrance, and by acting in unison with Gough's and Pottinger's a heavy crom fire could be brought to bear on any warships which come under view of the latter batteries,
This new armament would thus fulfil the double purpose of meeting the deficiencies I have enumerated under (ii) and (vi).
(iii.) That the two 12-pr. guns at the east end of Stonecutter's Island, and the two 6-inch guns at Kowloon (both of which batteries it has been decided to abolish) be retained for the purpose (a) of guarding this important channel (between Stonecutter's Island and the mainland) against torpedo attack; and (b) of using the 6-inch guns at Kowloon to sweep the inner harbour. (iv.) That the exposed position of the new docks and workshops belonging to Messrs. Butter- field and Swire, close to the inner eastern entrance, be carefully considered with a view to the posible provision of "boom dock gate" or other description of close defence.
(v.) That the system of searchlights be carefully re-examined and reconsidered with a view to the more efficient lighting of the important "Lamma Channel" on the west, and to ascertaining if an additional light will not be required to the east of Point d'Aguilar, should the new battery above that point be sanctioned and adopted.
It has to be remarked in regard to the sea defence of the western side of the island that the view and fire, both from Mount Davis and Stonecutter's, is certainly hampered by islands lying along across their range. These disabilities can only be minimised by the most careful and complete system of reconnaissance, observation, and transmission of information.
They remain, however, a weakness in the general system of defence against sea attack, and this renders it all the more necessary to be sure that such improvements in the defences as can be effected be adopted without delay.
A general element of danger in the defences of Hong Kong is the constantly prevailing fog, which is another reason for perfecting to the utmost the system of defence.
During the short time I was there I was only able to see gun practice once, although several such exercises had been arranged and were attempted.
It was also nearly impossible to judge of the due effect of the lighting.
APPENDIX III.
My Lord,
Governor to Secretary of State.
Government House, Hong Kong, January 17, 1910. I HAVE the honour to report to you the arrival of General Sir J. French, G.C.B., &c, Inspector-General of the Forces. I accompanied him on the 7th instant to the 9-2-inch battery on Mount Davis, and to the southern battery at Stonecutter's Island, which are the principal defences on the south and west, and on the 8th instant to the battery on the south side of the Lyeemoon Channel. Three conferences have taken place at Government House, at the latter of which Admiral Lambton was present.
2. I have learnt very definitely for the first time from General French what is the precise nature of the defence problem here. I am now informed that it is assumed as a fundamental axiom that if Great Britain lost her supremacy at sea she would no longer be able to retain this Colony, and that the scale of defences, therefore, are based on the assumption of that supremacy, with the proviso that in case of sudden outbreak of war it would take from three weeks to a month for naval reinforcements to arrive, and for that period this fortress must be strong enough to hold out against a Class "A" attack. If the hostile Power were any other than Japan it is sumed that our alliance with the latter would ensure the safety of Hong Kong. If the enemy were Japan, it is assumed that we should, in terms of our treaty, have twelve months' notice of her intention to denounce it, and therefore ample time to prepare for the new situation. I also learnt that it was practically unthinkable" that we should be involved in war with the United States of America. In this regard I venture to observe that a quarrel between the United States and Japan is a contingency which has been almost as widely discussed as a quarrel between ourselves and Germany, and that if unfortunately such a quarrel did break out, Great Britain would under her treaty be involved in war with America, whose naval base is only forty-eight hours from Hong Kong, while this Colony might not have the benefit of Japanese protection should that Power consider it strategically to her advantage to encounter the American Fleet in waters nearer to Japan.
3. The position, therefore, appears to be that at the present moment, and so long as the Japanese Treaty remains operative, there is no need for apprehension as regards Hong Kong except in the case I have supposed, but that when the Japanese Treaty terminates not only will the British Fleet in these waters be largely augmented, but the defences of Hong Kong must be such as to deter an enemy from making any serious attempt to capture it in the temporary
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