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Wishing to get an independent expert's views on these matters, I last September interrogated Admiral Ijuin, the present Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese battle squadron, about Port Arthur in the late war.
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I said, "I suppose it was the 17-inch guns that kept your fleet at a distance?" He replied, Yes."
I asked, “Would not 9-2-inch guns have done equally well?" He answered, “Yes, provided there were a great many of them.”
This is the obvious common sense of the business.
I have, dc.
(Signed)
HEDWORTH LAMBTON, Vice-Admiral.
APPENDIX II.
Extract from the Report of the Inspector-General of the Forces, dated March 15, 1910.
III-HONG KONG.
(3.) Local Defences,
(a.) Attack by Sea.
AFTER spending a fortnight in close inspection and examination of the defences of Hong Kong, I am of opinion that the authorised defence against attack by sea, when completed, will be quite inadequate to reasonably ensure the safety of the fortress for the minimum period of three weeks after war has broken out, during which we shall not hold the naval command of the China seas.
2. My reasons are as follows :---
(i.) There exist neither mines, submarines, nor destroyers to hinder an enemy's ships from coming to close quarters either to engage and attempt to silence the forts, or to undertake surprise operations of any kind.
(ii) The eastern entrance to the harbour is inadequately defended by gunfire, both as regards the numbers of guns employed and their position.
It is about 500 yards in width. Gough's and Pottinger's Batteries are on the north, and Pak-Sha-Wan Battery on the south. The former mount together three 9-2-inch guns, the latter three 6-inch guns.
This is really an inner eastern entrance. The outer eastern entrance lies some 4,000 to 6,000 yards to the south-eastward, between Cape Collinson on the south and Junk Island on the north.
This outer entrance is about 2,000 yards wide. The existence of these islands and promontories to the east to a great extent masks the view and fire of the three batteries which defend the inner eastern entrance.
For instance, a hostile warship could approach Cape Collinson unseen either from Gough's, Pottinger's, or Pak-Sha-Wan Batteries. She could then steam rapidly across the space of water between Cape Collinson and Junk Island, and bring fire to bear on these batteries in the transit. After being exposed to their fire for a minimum time, she would find cover and shelter behind the opposite arm of the entrance.
(iii.) There exists a good navigable channel between Stonecutter's Island and the mainland by which torpedo-boats can approach to attack which is not defended by any gunfire
whatever.
(iv.) The naval works and dockyard at Hong Kong and the new harbour works and docks of great size now under construction, and nearly completed, the ship building, mechanical and other resources, and the vulnerable situation of some (Messrs. Butterfield and Swire) quite close to the eastern entrance would constitute a powerful inducement to Japan or any other hostile Power to risk much to possess themselves of this important place, or to render it useless as a naval base, in the short time during which they might retain command of the sea.
(v.) If hostile ships once got past the forts at the entrance they would be fairly safe, as no system at present exists to sweep the inner harbour adequately with the fire of heavy guns.
(vi) The southern shores of the island of Hong Kong are quite unprotected by any fixed
defences.
(vii.) The electric light is deficient.
3. I recommend-
(i.) That the former system of mines (including the Brennan torpedo, which is still in store at Hong Kong) which existed up to five years ago be restored, and that local naval defence of the harbour, including submarines and destroyers, be provided.
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