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England's declared policy is as far as possible to do nothing in war as to interfere with trade -to do all she can to encourage British and neutral vessels to continue their peaceful avocations as in peace time.
It is impossible to believe that these traders would continue to freely visit Hong Kong with the knowledge that on any night a torpedo attack was liable to be made on the men-of-war there
at anchor.
6. The conclusion results that these men-of-war should not remain at night in their present anchorage, which offers every facility for a successful torpedo attack, but lie at a position removed from the trade of the town and whence they could easily proceed into the open sea.
This position, it appears to me, is undoubtedly the present examination anchorage-Chung Kwango, commonly called Junk Harbour.
To build a breakwater there would be a far easier and less costly undertaking than the proposed one between Green Island and Stonecutter's, for it is but 1 mile against 2, and the chart shows mud and shingle, therefore the foundations would be an easy matter.
There is practically no traffic in Junk Bay, so trade would not be interfered with, and His Majesty's ships would rest in absolute security, ready to sally forth at a moment's notice.
Also, as it is under 6 miles from present auchorage,” there would be no difficulty about provisions, &c.
Junk Bay would become to Hong Kong what Portland is to Portsmouth, and the war-ships once removed from the actual town, I believe no nation would be guilty of the brutality of attempting to torpedo peaceful trading vessels.
7. But to return to the main defences of Hong Kong.
When the island was acquired in 1841, England was undisputed mistress of the seas in Far Eastern waters, and there was cousequently no necessity for converting our new possession into a stronghold.
Also in those days ships were still only armed with smooth-bores, firing solid shot with a very limited range.
Hence those responsible for Hong Kong land defences were quite correct in concentrating their attention on the inner waters, and the defences were reasonably strong.
8. Now, however, all is changed.
European politics obviously necessitating the retention of the great bulk of our naval forces in home waters, thus leaving Japan completely supreme at sea.
This superiority there is no reasonable prospect of England being ever again able to challenge.
In fact it is more than probable that England will have in the future to content herself with third place, for the enormous sums that the United States of America is spending on the land defences of Subig and Manils clearly foreshadow the intention of that country to keep a powerful squadron in Asiatic waters.
This change in England's naval position in the Far East cannot be disputed, yet since the advent of Sir F. Owen's Committee the land defences of Hong Kong, instead of being increased, are relatively far weaker than they were ten years ago when I commanded His Majesty's ship "Powerful" on this station.
In those days in addition to the batteries there was a complete and efficient system of submarine mines.
The Russo-Japanese war incontestably proved the value of this means of defence, yet at the conclusion of that war for some unexplained reason the Committee of Imperial Defence decided to abolish that excellent form of protection, and Hong Kong in common with the rest of the fortified places in the British Empire was denuded of its minefields.
9. I notice from a letter, the 15th December, 1905, to the General Officer Commanding the Troops, Hong Kong, that the then Naval Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir G. Noel, one of the ablest and most trusted officers in the Service, states that he had "no information from the Admiralty on this proposed transfer," and further that he was "of opinion_that it is most inadvisable to dispense with the present arrangements for the defence of Hong Kong by mines.”
Also he mentions in the same letter that the "only indication of a change which I have received is that contained in an Admiralty letter dated the 6th May, which informed me it was in contemplation to establish a depôt of submarine boats at Hong Kong."
If such was then the intention, surely there has never been a more unhappy example of dropping the meat to grasp the shadow," for Hong Kong has lost her mines, and "where are the submarines?
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10. I observe in your Excellency's Budget speech on the 24th September you state: It is the Navy which protects our docks and coaling stations and not the comparatively small land force here."
This unfortunately can no longer be considered strictly correct.
11. In the latest Secret Colonial Defence Memorandum, the 15th March, 1907, and which is doubtless in your archives, it is stated that “ Hong Kong should be regarded as liable to clams (A) attack by battle-ships."
Now, even assuming the China Squadron to be here, the weakly armed and slightly armoured 1st class cruisers which form the main fighting strength of this squadron were never intended to, nor have any pretentions to, cope with modern battle-ships.
They are in the same relative position as were frigates to line-of-battle-ships in the old wars, and I remember reading Napoleon's remarks at St. Helena to Dr. O'Meara, in which he, I believe correctly, states the fact that, in spite of England's boasted superiority in naval fighting, there was no single case in which an English frigate had defeated or captured a French line-of- battle-ship.
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