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6. It is obvious that the course of events in war cannot be predicted with certainty; and in recording the following opinions as to the probable nature and scale of oversea attack on the Pacific Coast of Canada, the Admiralty desire that it should be understood that they must not be held to have given an absolute guarantee that any particular form of operation will not be undertaken in war. All that they claim to do is to state what forms of oversea attack, having regard to the general strategic situation, they consider to be reasonably probable, with a view to furnishing a reasoned basis for determining the standard of defences required at any place, so as to ensure that the defences are provided on a uniform system and wasteful expenditure avoided.
7. The following particulars of the naval porta and the available military forces of Powers having possessions on the Pacific serve to indicate the relative capabilities of each to undertake naval or military operations on the Pacific Coast of Canada :——
(a.) France. The French fortified port nearest to Prince Rupert is Saigon, about
6,200 miles distant.
The peace strength of the garrison of French Indo-China is now 25,000 men, of whom 11,690 are Europeans. In the event of war 16,000 to 18,000 native reservists and 8,000 gardes, indigènes would be available, besides about 7,000 Europeans who have undergone military training. The native troops are indifferent and the military position is still considered somewhat precarious, although the internal conditions of the country are improving.
(b.) Germany. The German fortified port nearest to Prince Rupert is Kiao-chau
(" Tsing-tâu ”), 4,722 miles distant.
The establishment of the garrison of Kiao-chau is 2,240 men. There are also about 400 reservists, who can be called out when required. (c.). Russia.-The Russian fortified port nearest to Prince Rupert is Vladivostock,
3,971 miles distant.
The war between Russia and Japan has been so recently concluded that it is not yet possible to forecast the future naval and military position of Russia in the Far East. Her permanent military garrisons will no doubt be of considerable size.
(d.) United States.-The American naval base nearest to Prince Rupert is Seattle
572 miles distant.
(e.) Japan.—The nearest base in Japan is Nagasaki, 4,340 miles distant from
Prince Rupert.
Japan has a standing army of nineteen divisions complete and fit for service in every detail. A division at war strength is about 20,000 men. With the addition of certain reserve brigades and of her national army, Japan could probably place over a million men in the field.
8. Having regard to the comparative weakness of their naval and military forces in those regions and to the remoteness of their bases from Canadian territory, it is to the last degree improbable that either France or Germany could undertake naval or military operations of a serious character on the Pacific Coast of Canada. While Russia, in spite of her great military resources in Eastern Asia, owing to her naval weakness, appears for the present to be precluded from undertaking serious operations
oversea.
9. In view of the remoteness of the contingency of a war with the United States, and of the numerous objectives that would be readily accessible to that Power by an advance overland, it is not considered necessary, in calculating the standard of the local defences required on the Pacific Coast of Canada, to take into special consideration the scale of attack that could be brought to bear by that Power.
10. As regards Japan, the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has, up to the present time, relieved us from the necessity of considering the scale of attack that Japan could bring to bear on British possessions in the Pacific. For, so long as the Japanese Alliance remains operative, not only is the risk of attack by Japan excluded from the category of reasonable probabilities to be provided against, but British naval requirements are held to be adequately met if the combined British and Japanese forces in the Eastern seas are superior to the forces of any probable combination of two naval Powers.
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