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16. It is thus evident that so long as British naval strength is calculated and maintained on the basis of securing command of the sea against all probable enemies the nature and scale of the oversea attacks to which Australian territory will be exposed, even during the period that local command of the sea temporarily rests with the enemy, will be subject to definite limitations.
The size of the oversea expeditionary force that Japan could bring against Australia will be limited by the condition that there must be a reasonable probability that any enterprise undertaken could be brought to a successful conclusion before a British fleet could intervene.
17. On strategic grounds, therefore, it is highly improbable that Japan would undertake serious operations against Australia until she had rendered her long oversea communications with her base secure from the risk of interruption.
The first step towards achieving this object would be the capture of Hong Kong, which affords a convenient base for operations against her oversea communications. But even if the capture of Hong Kong had been effected, complete security of her communication from the risk of interruption would not be assured until the Japanese fleet was in a position to destroy or to mask all the British naval reinforcements that might be dispatched to the Pacific-that is, until the Japanese fleet had succeeded in wresting from the British navy the permanent command of the seas.
18. Having regard to these considerations, the Admiralty adhere to the view that, so long as the British fleet remains capable of acting on the offensive, it is not reasonably probable that any land attack on Australia, more formidable than a raid by a small landing force as now laid down, will be undertaken.
Standard of Defences.
19. In view of the opinion expressed in paragraph 8 of this Memorandum, that Sydney, as the base of the Australian fleet unit, should in the future be regarded as liable to attack by armoured cruisers, it follows that the armament should be increased so as to enable it to deal with this form of attack. It is accordingly recommended that the armament of Sydney should be strengthened by the provision of further 9.2-inch guns to deter attack by armoured cruisers. In this connection attention is drawn to the Colonial Defence Committee's Memorandum No. 414 M., dated the 22nd December, 1909, in which the standard of primary armament required at defended ports exposed to attack by armoured ships is discussed.
As regards the armament of other Australian defended ports which are regarded as liable to attack by unarmoured vessels only, the Committee adhere to the view expressed in paragraph 10 of their Memorandum No. 362 M., dated the 15th May, 1906, that the 6-inch gun is the weapon which best fills requirements; and they have no modifications to make in their recommendations for the armament of each defended port, contained in their Memorandum No. 363 M., dated the 16th May, 1906, on the Revision of Coast Defences of Australia.
J. R. CHANCELLOR, Secretary,
Colonial Defence Committee.
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December 22, 1910.
PRINTED AT THE FOREIGN OFFICEH BY J. › HARRISON.— 23/12/1910.
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