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it.
Our economic situation was so serious that we could not afford to lose
the orders or take the further risks that would be involved for our trade
with South Africa. If we were to supply the arms, it might be that the South African Government, who had shown some limited willingness to help
towards a settlement in Rhodesia, would co-operate more closely with us
On these grounds he recommended jointly with the Defence Secretary that we
should supply the maritime defence equipment which South Africa was secking
though not the spares for Centurion tanks. A decision could be presented
as an extension of our current policy of continuing to supply certain items
of military equipment and spares where we recognised an obligation to do so
and where the ability of the South African Government to enforce apartheid
was not increased if we did so. The timing of any announcement would be a
matter for discussion with South Africa.
In discussion the view was expressed that the moral issue involved in
supplying arms to South Africa was so important and our commitment to it
so deep that we should not supply them. If we did so we could not avoid
the charge that we put economic interests above principle. Although
our general trade with South Africa might be put at risk if we did not
supply the arms, this was not certain and we had to take into account the
substantial investments and trade that might be lost in other countries
in Africa and elsewhere in the Afro-Asian world if we did supply the arms.
In the longer term it might not be to our advantage to continue to link
ourselves closely in trade matters with South Africa since the policy of
apartheid was bound in the long run to lead to disaster. If the South
African Government had been willing and able to give us substantial help
towards an honourable settlement in Rhodesia, the supply of arms might then
have been morally more justifiable. We could not hope to move towards a
United Nations solution for Rhodesia if we decided to supply arms to
South Africa.
On the other hand it was strongly urged that, in our present economic
circumstances, we could not afford to lose the order for raritime defence
equipment or put our trade with South Africa generally at risk; informed opinion was unanimous that this would happen if we did not supply the arms
and the total trade loss might be as high as £300 million. Although we
had substantial trading interests in the countries of black Africa, their
economic expansion was slower than in South Africa; moreover it was much
more likely that South Africa would take reprisals against us if we failed to supply the arms, than that other countries in Africa which would not act together would do so if we did supply them. The devaluation of sterling had
nade it essential that our economy should be placed on a firm footing and if
this was to be done a reappraisal of policies such as that not to supply arns
to South Africa was essential. In present circumstances we could not afford to regard any particular commitment or policy as immune from reconsideration.
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