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Our Delegation to the forthcoming talks should therefore be instructed
that, if the Russians raised the Cuban issue and it become clear that
routes for BOAC to operate across Siberia would be forthcoming only if we
were prepared to facilitate Soviet access to Cuba, they were authorised
to explore fully, though without commitment, what were the best terms
on which agreement could be reached. They should not, however, be
authorised to record any undertaking in this matter without authority
from London and the grant of such authority should be considered at the
time by the Foreign Secretary and himself.
In discussion the view was strongly expressed that at the present time the risk to our relations with the United States and Venezuela,
and of retaliatory action against our trade especially by the United
States Congress, if we were either to negotiate or appear to be ready
to negotiate an air services agreement to facilitate Soviet access to
Cuba, heavily outweighed the advantages that we would derive from a
share for BOAC in an air route across Siberia. We should therefore
not raise this matter ourselves and should explicitly refuse to grant
the rights if the Soviet Union asked for them. Although retaliatory action
had not resulted from following our interests in trade matters such as the
loyalty steel rebates, we should avoid rousing the strong feelings in the
United States about Cuba by facilitating direct Soviet access to Cuba.
Moreover, there appeared no great likelihood that we should in fact be
able to secure such rights for BOAC in the near future. No other air-
line was yet operating on the route and in recent months the Saiet Union
had shown less willingness than previously to reach agreements with us;
for example the Navigation Treaty which the Soviet Prime Minister,
Mr. Kosygin, had appeared to be ready to sign when he visited London
early this year, was still under negotiation.
THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up the discussion, said that it would be
against our wider interests to appear to be ready at this point in time
to facilitate Soviet air access to Cuba, although it might be that in due
course the risks to us of doing so would decrease. Our delegation to
the forthcoming discussions in Moscow should therefore be instructed not
to raise the question of a possible route for AEROFLOT through or over
this country to Cuba; if the Russians themselves raised it, the
delegation should take note and say that the point was not covered by
their instructions; they should however seek to explore precisely what
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