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2.
MAURITIUS: DEFENCE AGREEMENT
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The Committee considered a memorandum by the Minister of State for
Commonwealth Affairs (0PD(67) 81) on a Defence Agreement with Mauritius.
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS (Lord Shepherd) said
that it was necessary for us to open negotiations quickly for a Defence
Agreement with the Government of Mauritius in order to safeguard our communi cations centre there (HMS MAURITIUS) after the country became independent
on 12th March 1968.
There are two points of difficulty on the draft Agreement; the first,
which arose on draft Article 3, was how to deal with the undertaking to con-
sult in the event of a threat to the internal security of Mauritius, which
we had given at the Mauritius Constitutional Conference in 1965; the second,
which arose on draft Article 9, was the term to be set to the Agreement.
As regards draft Article 3, it was proposed that an undertaking to consult
with the Government of Mauritius on any request for such assistance which
would be in the Agreement itself, should be supplemented by a confidential
Exchange of Letters which would make it clear that the provision of assistance
would be entirely at our discretion. On the term of the Agreement, Mauritius
would wish to make this as long as possible; but we would prefer a seven-
year term.
Our negotiators should, however, have latitude to settle for up to ten years should this prove necessary.
In discussion it was argued that for us to take the unprecedented step
of undertaking to assist an independent Commonwealth country in the event
of a threat to its internal security would be inconsistent with our new
defence policy and, in particular, with our objective of withdrawing by
stages from our role East of Suez; instability in Mauritius, deriving from
its population explosion and economic difficulties might involve us in com-
mitments from which we might not easily escape. On the other hand it was
argued that we could not, because of changes in our own policy, go back on an undertaking that we had given in 1965. The facilities that we were
seeking to safeguard in Mauritius were important to us and the very limited
undertaking that was proposed as regards the internal security threat was
not inconsistent with our plans for a withdrawal from the Far East.
It was
important, however, that the length and extent of our commitment to assist
in internal security should be as restricted as possible in view of the
economic situation in Mauritius; we were at present providing budgetary aid
to Mauritius and any continuing internal security commitment on our part
which discouraged its Government from taking the necessary measures to correct the economic situation, would increase the risk of our having to
provide extre aid.
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