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production which this implied could not, of course, be totally binding because it was dependent in some degree on the technical success of the development stage. It could therefore be argued that our legal obligation extended only up to the granting of a certificate of air- worthiness, and that a fresh agreement would then be needed to cover the arrangements for production. There might at that stage be a possibility of extricating ourselves. Meanwhile it was important to be very careful how far we got involved in production. It appeared
that we had already spent about £4 million on the production phase,
for the procurement of machine tools and long-dated materials. Although
it could be argued that this was an essential preliminary to the
production stage and necessary in order to maintain our lead over the
United States, the fact that we had already committed ourselves to some
extent to production might make it more difficult for us to abandon
the project after the granting of a certificate of airworthiness.
In discussion it was argued that we should decide either to pursue
the project whole-heartedly or to present the technical and economic case for abandonment frankly to General de Gaulle, asking him whether the
advice he had received was substantially different and whether in the
light of these forecasts he considered that the project merited continued
support. The latter alternative could not be implemented until the
revised cost estimates had been received in December, and even then it
would carry the serious risk that General de Gaulle might take political
advantage of the fact that we had put ourselves in his hands. The Minister of Technology's memorandum summarised the present technical and economic position of the project, but it did not provide an adequate statement of the case for maintaining an advanced aircraft industry in this country. Before reaching a decision on the future of Concord and on whether or not we should make an approach to General de Gaulle, it was necessary to have an assessment of the importance of the aircraft industry to this country, of the optimum programme for that industry, and of its future structure. At present it would seen that the cancellation of Concord would almost certainly lead to the collapse of the British Aircraft
Corporation. It might also mean that we should lose the capability of developing an advanced combat aircraft for service in the late 1970s.
On the other hand, it could be argued that there was little justification for sponsoring unrewarding aircraft projects in order to preserve the capability to sponsor yet another generation of unrewarding aircraft in the more distant future. A study of the importance to our industrial and
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