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CONCORD: WHETHER OR NOT TO CONTINUE
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The Committee considered a memorandum by the Minister of Technology (OPD(67) 79) on the alternative courses that could be adopted in relation to the Concord project.
THE MINISTER OF TECHNOLOGY said that a choice had to be made between
pressing ahead vigorously with the Concord project or working actively
towards its cancellation on acceptable terms. The uncertainty of technological success was not in itself sufficient to justify cancellation,
but it would not be known for another twelve months or more how the four
problems of sonic boom, engine noise, weight-growth and runway loading
would be solved. The economic prospects were not encouraging, but
calculations based on a variety of assumptions, though taking account
only of the national resources yet to be committed, demonstrated that
an implied preference for foreign exchange of 20-30 per cent would probably be achieved, and a precedent for this figure could be found in the computer field, in the decision to put British equipment in the
Phantom end in the aluminium smelter scheme. The immediate industrial
consequences of cancellation would be the loss of about 10,000 jobs in
the Bristol area, and the subsequent effects on the whole of our aircraft
industry would be profound. Cancellation would also be a setback to our
policy of technological co-operation in Europe and might aggravate the
brain drain. The French reaction to cancellation or even to a hint
that we were contemplating cancellation would almost certainly be
antagonistic; and they would seek to derive the maximum political, financial and industrial advantage from it in the context of our application for membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) and our professed
desire to further European technological collaboration. When the Concord
prototype was rolled out in December, the Minister of State, Ministry of Technology, would have an opportunity of discussing the future of the
project with the French Minister of Transport, M. Chamant. Revised estimates of the total cost of development were now being prepared by British and French Working Groups of Officials, and the outcome of their examination would be available in December.
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL said that the Concord treaty could be regarded as being an agreement to produce and sell aircraft, with arrangements for sharing both the development costs and the proceeds of sales. The Confidential Annex of 1962 made it clear that the agreement was for the development of prototypes, followed by production. The commitment to
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