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2, SOUTH ARABIA
(Previous Reference: OPD(67) 29th Meeting Minutes, Item 1)
THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that the situation in South Arabia had.
altered greatly since the decisions were taken earlier in the year that
our policy should be based on withdrawing our forces from the mainland early in January 1968, on bringing South Arabia to independence under a
Federal Government broadened, so far as possible, to include other
elements in South Arabia and on providing maritime and air support to
the new State against external aggression for a period after independence.
The revolt in the South Arabian Army, the disintegration of the Federal
Government and the failure of the Rulers to maintain their authority even in their own States, had left the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) as the dominant
political forces in South Arabia. Negotiations had been taking place for
some time in Cairo between the NLF and FLOSY about the formation of a
government for South Arabia but no agreement between them was yet in sight.
There was thus no government to which we could hand over our responsibilities
in South Arabia and there was a risk that the South Arabia Army, which had
been the main stabilising influence in the country in recent months, would
be split into NLF and FLOSY factions. The run-down of our forces in
South Arabia, and the removal of our military stores had gone according to
plan and would be completed by mid-November apart from those required for
the final period before withdrawal.
in
Our policy and plans must be adjusted to meet the new situation;
particular there was no advantage in retaining our forces in South Arabia
until January 1968. A major reason for their presence was disappearing
with the parallel withdrawal of the United Arab Republic forces in the
Yemen, which was nearing completion. In the period between now and the
end of the year, our forces would be exposed to increasing risk from acts
of terrorism as their strength declined and as the competing factions in
South Arabia sought credit by attacking them; it did not appear that our
forces could contribute to a political settlement which might indeed be
reached more quickly if they were withdrawn as soon as possible.
He therefore proposed that we should bring forward the final date of
withdrawal of our troops to the second half of November and announce this
early in the following week; we should plan on 22nd November as the date
of withdrawal but leave open the possibility that this might be delayed
until 30th November should developments in the next two weeks make this
desirable. At the same time he proposed that we should now withdraw the
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