TOP SECRET
Page 255
in existence for evacuation of our own forces and their families and of
about 500 other people whether our position became untenable as a result of a direct attack by Chinese forces or because there was a breakdown of law and order in Hong Kong. In any event it would be impossible to evacuate the 250,000 people concerned. The key to the situation was the maintenance of confidence in Hong Kong and the continued demonstration to the Chinese that we intended to stay in the Colony, though we must avoid
acting in a provocative fashion. Visits by large naval vessels and by aircraft from Singapore were valuable for this purpose and we should also continue to allow recreational visits by United States warships. Although
the recent rains had made Hong Kong independent for the present of water
supplies from the mainland and the willingness of the Chinese Government to renew normal supply arrangements when these were due to restart later in the year might provide a pointer to their attitude to our position in
the Colony.
THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up the discussion, said that the Committee
recognised the difficulty of carrying out any further contingency planning for a possible withdrawal from Hong Kong and the grave risk that would
ensue to our position there should it ever become know there that such
planning was taking place. Nevertheless, they took the view on balance
that such planning should be carried out, though strictly within the limits
and subject to the restrictions recommended in the report by officials.
The circulation of the papers involved should be reviewed and confined
within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the work being carried
out. Visits by our warships and aircraft and recreational visits by
United States warships to Hong Kong should continue on the present basis.
The Ministerial Committee on Hong Kong should keep the situation under
close review and the Chairman should inform him if it were at any time
proposed to take further measures of importance to deter the Chinese from
taking action against Hong Kong.
The Committee
(1) Took note, with approval, of the Prime Minister's summing
up of their discussion.
(2) Invited the Commonwealth Secretary, in consultation with
other Ministers concerned, to arrange for contingency planning for the possible withdrawal from Hong Kong to be carried out on the basis indicated by the Prime Minister.
(3) Instructed the Secretaries to review and to limit the
circulation of papers on this issue in accordance with the Prime Minister's summing up.
Cabinet Office, S..1.
31st July 1967
Page 255
(97793)
-2-
TOP SECRET
Page 255