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Malaysia, we should be disregarding the strong representations made to us
by our allies; we should risk an immediate loss of confidence in the area
and with it the disappearance of the present regime in Singapore, both of which were essential to an orderly withdrawal of our forces and to our
commercial interests. The announcement of a precise date in the middle
1970s would also make it more difficult for us to withdraw earlier than this
should circumstances permit, and would increase pressure on us to state how
we planned to maintain a capability for use in the Far East after our
withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia before it was desirable to take firm
decisions on this. On the other hand, the fact that we were planning to
withdraw from Singapore and Malaysia by about 1975 was now widely known as
a result of disclosures by our allies. This would make it difficult to
maintain that a decision to this effect had not been taken and, unless this
could be stated publicly, the political advantages that would flow from an
announcement of the decision would be lost; it would also not be possible to
state and explain the rundown in the strength of the forces that we were
planning between 1970-71 and 1975-76 or the further savings in defence
expenditure that were planned in this period. It was agreed that, on
balance, it would be best to indicate in the forthcoming Defence White
Paper that we had decided to withdraw our forces from Singapore and Malaysia
by the mid 1970s, explaining in debate if necessary that this meant between
1973 and 1977, but that the precise date of our withdrawal would depend on progress towards stability in the area and on the solution of other
associated problems;
this would give us the necessary flexibility to
withdraw before 1975 particularly if, in the next few years, the war in
Vietnam came to an end.
The Committee
(1) Approved OPD(67) 46 subject to the points made in discussion.
(2) Invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in consultation with
the Commonwealth Secretary and the Minister for Overseas Development to consider and report to the Committee in the light of the report under preparation by officials, on the amount and governing principles of aid to be made available to Singapore and Malaysia.
(3) Invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in consultation with
the Defence Secretary to arrange for further examination of the not impact of defence expenditure on the balance of payments and to report the outcome to the Committec.
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
4th July 1967
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