reduction of our commitments outside Europe, to the nature of our commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which required the
retention of armoured units in Germany, and to the decision to maintain a capability mainly in terms of naval (including amphibious) and air forces
for use in the Far East beyond the mid-1970s.
This was an essential
feature of a policy aimed at avoiding the risk of involvement in
hostilities overseas which would flow from the stationing there of land
forces.
As regards the proposals in paragraph 48(c) to order no further Harrier (P 1127) or Phantom aircraft, it was agreed that these were
acceptable subject in the case of the Phantom to discussion at the next
meeting of the Committee of how best to deal with the consequences of the
French decision not to proceed with the Anglo-French variable geometry
aircraft.
Paragraph (19)
It was agreed that further consideration was required of the estimate of the net balance of payments cost of the defence programme in OPD(67) 49.
Paragraphs (22)–(32)
The view was expressed that the basic assumptions underlying the
suggested levels of mitigatory aid to Singapore and Malaysia required
further examination; they appeared to result in an increasing burden on
us over the years in parallel with the size of our force reduction;
instead we should seek to agree with Singapore and Malaysia a basis for
granting aid which would enable us to withdraw our forces more rapidly
from those two countries by linking any aid that we gave to the co-operation
of those countries with us in securing an earlier withdrawal of our forces
from Singapore and Malaysia.
In discussion it was agreed that further examination was necessary by
the Ministers mainly concerned of the amounts of aid to be granted to
Singapore and Malaysia, and of the principles that should govern this in
the light of the detailed proposals which were being prepared by officials,
and that, until this examination had been completed, the Committee should
defer consideration of these paragraphs of the report.
Paragraph (35)
There was general agreement that the extent to which we should be
prepared to indicate in the forthcoming Defence White Paper our precise
intentions in the Far East was of crucial importance, politically. If we
were to give now a precise date for our withdrawal from Singapore and
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