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As regards Europe, it was possible that there might be some
agreement between NATO powers and the Warsaw Pact powers which
would make it possible to achieve mutual force reductions, but we
could not plan on such a course and, without such agreement, We
were bound, both juridically and in the interest of our basic
security, not to carry out further reductions without the agreement
of our allies. Discussions during the previous year had demonstrated
their resistance to any further reductions of British forces in
Europe and we could not count therefore on being able to withdraw
more than a further brigade as was envisaged by the report: and even that was likely to be difficult to negotiate. In any event
we must retain the basic commitment and it was of greater
importance to withdraw wholly from commitments elsewhere. As
regards the Middle East it was pointed out that the presence of
our forces in the Persian Gulf and the maintenance of our commit-
ment to the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) had proved of great
importance to our interests in the supply of oil during the current
crisis in the Middle East, since they served to maintain our
relationship with Iran. This was essential to the continuation of
Iranian oil supplies, which were in turn of crucial importance to us at the present time. As regards the Far East the examination of
the damage which would be caused to the economy of Singapore even by
the rate of withdrawal envisaged in the report and the risk to political
stability in Singapore, which would thereby be involved, together with
the reactions of our other allies in this area during the recent series
of Ministerial discussions, had amply demonstrated that we could not,
consonant with our interests, withdraw all our forces and facilities
in Malaysia and Singapore by 1970-71. The need to obtain the
acquiescence of our allies had in fact already led the Cabinet not only to agree that we should aim to withdraw by 1975-76 but also that after our withdrawal we would maintain a military capability
for use in the Far East thereafter;
accordingly.
}
and we had informed our allies
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