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(e) Insofar as the proposed measures involved expenditure across the exchanges we should seek to make countervailing savings in other items of
Government overseas expenditure eslewhere. Much, however, of the £10 million expenditure proposed would not involve a cost in foreign exchange since we should be supplying British-nade military equipment. Sone of the equipment (e.g. the Hunter aircraft) were surplus to our own requirements and so would not even represent a direct budgetary cost (though we should be denying ourselves the opportunity of selling the air- craft to other possible purchasers). Other items of equipment (e.g. the Saladin armoured cars) would come from stocks intended for use by our own forces and there would be a budgetary cost involved in replacing then. Messer duch of the proposed expenditure would only be incurred if our
policy were successful and the objectives achieved since, if the Federal
Government failed to survive, the question of payment would not arise.
(f) It was now clear that our efforts to persuade the states of the EAP to
join the South Arabian Federation would not be successful at the present
time. Some of the states were willing to join but they would not do so
without quaiti, whose young and inexperienced ruler would not take a
decision of this noment until it was clearer whether the Federation would
survive. If, as we had threatened, we gave no continuing aid to the EAP
oustide the Federation, there was a risk of a return to the endemic tribal
warfare in the area, with consequent threat both to the Federation and to
Muscat and Oman to the east. This was a development which we should if possible prevent, as part of our policy of leaving behind a stable South Arabia Federation, and accordingly the series of proposed measures included a recommendation (strongly supported by the High Commissioner and local officials) that we should pay to keep the HBL in being for at least two years,
by which time, if the Federation survived, the EAP states might cone to
decide to join it. The HBL had a British commander, a retired British Army
Officer on contract; neither his position, nor the financial support we should continue to give, would commit us to provide military assistance to
the EAP states if attacked. Specific arrangements had been proposed, though they would require further examination, linking the Federation with our
financial support of the HBL; and we should not be committed to continue to
support the HBL if the situation changed radically or, ex hypothesi, if the
HBL failed to remain in being.
(e) The proposal to release up to one-third of existing detainees, while terrorist activity still continued, would be criticised in some quarters;
but it was a prerequisite of making some political progress in the Federation, and in addition might have some presentational advantage at the
United Nations.
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