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(b)
Paragraph 13 of the Foreign Secretary's memorandum: might be taken as implying that it was an object of our policy to avert permanently the taking
over of South Arabia by the United Arab Republic under President Nasser.
This implication was not intended. But it was in our interest to leave
behind, at least in the short term, an independent South Arabia and thus to
thwart any intentions which President Nasser might have of achieving a
victory in South Arabia to compensate for his defeat by Israel; we should
not, however, permit this consideration, important though it was to our
interests elsewhere in the Middle East, to override our primary objective of
withdrawing militarily from South Arabia according to plan. However, there
was considerable disillusion with President Nasser in the Arab world, and it
would not be in our interest so to manage affairs in South Arabia as to
enable President Nasser to recover his reputation.
(c) The effect of the recent Middle East war had been to increase the need
for further assistance and encouragement to the South Arabian Federal
Government and forces. As things wore,
there was a risk that difficulties
in maintaining Aden Port in operation might even lead to a need to make a
rapid withdrawal of our forces with a consequent loss of equipment and in circumstances which would bring us into disrepute.
(a) The Middle East war had put strain on our balance of payments position
both through the closing of the Suez Canal to shipping and through the interruption in our oil supplies from Middle East countries. The proposed measures of support to South Arabia would not be palatable to President Nasser and it was suggested that it might have the effect of pro- longing denial of the Suez Canal to our shipping. It was however the general view that our actions in South Arabia would not affect this issue one way or the other. On the other hand, by giving further support to South Arabia we were likely to strengthen our relations with the oil supplying states of the Persian Gulf, and Saudi Arabia. This was of great importance since the recent examination of possibilities of finding alternative long- term sources of oil supplies had indicated that we should have to continue to rely for much of our oil on the Gulf states, whose stability was there- fore of major concern to us. It was arguable whether the presence of British military forces in the Middle East helped or hindered the uninter- rupted flow of oil; but it was significant that the Persian Gulf states and Saudi Arabia were pressing us to maintain a military presence, and that the oil companies had expressed anxiety about our withdrawal from South Arabia. On balance the proposed measures were more likely to assist than to hinder the recovery of our balance of payments position following the recent war.
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