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Above
In discussion it was recognised that the acceptance of this
additional commitment was unwelcome in itself and posed certain political
difficulties for our broader interests in the Middle East. The effect
of a commitment of bombers, which to be effective must show their presence
ostentatiously over South Arabian eir space at least in the early months
after independence, must be considered in relation to the lies that had
been broadcast that British and American aircraft had been used in the
recent hostilities for attacks on the UAR. Nevertheless, the commitment
of the V bombers was likely to be welcomed by a number of Arab states, and
particularly by Saudi Arabia, which had been much concerned that we should not abandon South Arabia in the face of likely Egyptian aggression.
all it was of major importance that the offer should give the required
additional confidence to the Federal Government of South Arabia:
night prove to be the key to the development of the local situation on
more satisfactory lines. In these circumstances, there was general
agreement that, though it was impossible to be certain in a judgment of
the outcome, the balance of advantage appeared to lie substantially in favour of making the offer proposed. There was also agreement that the duration of the offer should be a matter for the Government's discretion,
though there might be some advantage in emphasising in the course of the
forthcoming debate on the position of South Arabia that we attached importance to reviewing our commitment in October 1968 when the build-up of the South Arabian forces should be complete.
The Committee
Approved OPD(67) 44.
this
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
12th June 1967
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