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alternatively, they might seek to restore something of their prestige by strengthening their military position in the Yemen. For the same reason, it was possible that they might decide to risk an attack on South Arabia after independence, despite the deterrent that would be posed by the
V bombers.
The balance of advantage, however, was in his view in favour of making the offer and stating that it would be extended beyond the six months' period of the offer of carrier-borne air forces, but that it would be continued or terminated entirely at the discretion of the United
Kingdon Government.
THE DEFENCE SECRETARY said that there should be no difficulty
is e vis obtaining the agreement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to stationing four V bombers at Masirah and the
additional cost of doing so would be negligible. Militarily, the use
that could be nade of V bombers would necessarily be limited; in particular,
they could not be used effectively against local insurgency, but only in
the event of outright attack by Egyptian forces and even then they could not be used for either ground attack or interception. Politically, it
might be that this offer would put the position of the Sultan of Muscat
at greater risk of subversion in his own territory and it was for
consideration what effect the offer would have on our wider interests
in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the balance of advantage night well
favour making the offer, but it would be desirable to put some limitation
on it and this might be to relate the length of our commitment to the
effective building up of the forces of the independent government of
South Arabia.
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (Lord Shackleton) said that the
principal difficulty at present in South Arabia was the lack of confidence
their ability of the Federal Government being that they would be able to cope with the
problems with which they would be faced after independence unless they were
given protection against external aggression.
Furthermore, unless they
were given greater confidence, it would be impracticable to obtain
agreement on any broadening of their political composition. Their
principal objection to the offer of carrier-borne air forces was that it
would only last for six months and despite the limitation on the role in
which the V bombers could be used, they should pose an effective deterrent
against Egyptian aggression and would in any event give the South Arabian
Government the necessary additional confidence. His own preference would
be to make a commitment that such bombers would be made available for up
to two years after independence, but there were advantages in making the
date of termination a matter for our discretion.
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