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keep a military presence of some kind in the area, preferably on the
ground in Singapore, though he did not discount the potential value of
rotating forces from the United Kingdom or from Australia.
He was
anxious to regard the whole operation not as a parting of the ways, but
as an evolution towards a new and different relationship between two
Commonwealth countries.
In
The reaction of Malaysian Ministers had been broadly similar.
addition they had expressed a preference for our retention in the area
after 1970-71 of predominently maritime and air forces: they had
recognised that these would be mainly, or wholly, based on Singapore.
They had also assumed that our force reductions at least over the next
few years would not affect the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement.
Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, was concerned about
the effect of our plans on Brunei, which he felt we should encourage at
the appropriate stage to come under the wing of Malaysia. He had
volunteered that he would approach the Australian and New Zealand
Governments to suggest a new and closer defence relationship and had seen
advantages in discussion later in the summer, probably in London,
between the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth countries concerned.
Plans for the reduction of our forces by about 20,000 by
1st April 1968 were now being prepared by the Commander-in-Chiof and our redundancy proposals would later be discussed with the Governments
of Singapore and Malaysia, In discussion on both countries of the
proposals for further reductions thereafter, it had emerged that it was
unlikely to be practicable to preserve the Commonwealth Brigade as an
efficient unit and the Commander-in-Chief, Far East was now discussing
the implications of our proposals with the military authorities in
Australia and New Zealand: he would make it clear in doing so that our proposals were not yet fira decisions. It would also be necessary to make further reductions of the Gurkhas after 1969, probably from 10,000
to some 5-6,000. The timing of any announcement of such a reduction
would require further consideration and prior consultation with the
Governments of Nepal and India. The reductions in our forces would also
require the reduction or restriction of our force declarations to the
South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). The choice would lie
between a major reduction in, or the abolition of, our commitments to
SEATO on the one hand, or on the other hand a lesser reduction in such
commitments coupled with a substantial reduction in our responsibilities
under the Malaysian Defence Agreement. His own proference would be for
the former course.
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