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CABINET
DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
(OPD(67) 17th Meeting)
(FRIDAY, 21st APRIL 1967 at 2.00 p.m.)
Copy No. 31
DEFENCE EXPENDITURE STUDIES
(Previous Reference: OPD (67) 15th Meeting, Item 1)
THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that during his consultations in Washington
earlier that week about the changes that we intended to make in our policy and
military deployment in the Far East, his task had been made more difficult by
the restrictions placed upon him by the Cabinet's decision that we should
not, at least at this stage, discuss the possibility that, after we had withdrawn from Singapore/Malaysia, we might maintain a maritime and air presence in the area using facilities in Australia. The Defence Secretary would face a similar problem during his forthcoming visit to the Far East for
consultations with the Governments of Singapore and Malaysia. We could not
expect to secure even the acquiescence of our allies in our plans to withdraw from the mainland of Asia (apart from Hong Kong) by the mid-1970s unless we
were able to say that we were ready to maintain such a presence thereafter and
this issue called for early reconsideration by the Cabinet.
He had found a general readiness on the part of the United States
Government and of the New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr. Holyoake, and the Lustralian Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Hasluck, to accept our plan to reduce our forces in Singapore/Malaysia by about half by 1970-71, but all were
opposed to our presenting this rundown in the context of an intention to with- draw altogether from Singapore/Malaysia by the mid-1970s. The Australian
reaction to our plans had been particularly strong and only the Americans
accepted our view that, once the war in Vietnam was over, white troops were
likely to be unwelcome in South East Asia. The Americans, including
President Johnson, the Vice-President Mr. Humphrey, the Secretary of State,
Mr. Rusk, and the Secretary for Defense, Mr. McNamara, were particularly
concerned that we should not announce any intention to withdraw completely from
the Far East because of the effects this would have on the policy of the United States Administration, given the attitude of the Senate. They had also
stated categorically that if we were to withdraw from the Far East there was
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