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on their policies in this area but would also gravely disturb our relations with Australia and New Zealand. Indeed it seemed improbable in the extreme
that we should be able to obtain the acquiesence of our allies in the programme of our withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore unless we were prepared to maintain thereafter a small military presence in Australia.
any event it would be undesirable to offer to determine our military presence in Malaysia and Singapore up to this stage on the basis that we were prepared to divide in accordance with the wishes of our allies a total
predetermined expenditure between armed forces and economic aid. To do
so would make it impossible to carry out a planned programme for the
reduction of our forces and to withdraw from commitments in orderly
fashion in a manner which was essential to the reduction of our armed
forces as a whole. Moreover such a policy would be to subject us to
pressure from the United States to maintain with financial assistance from
them commitments which it was in our best interests to reduce and
eventually to eliminate. It would be preferable to maintain firmly our
plans for the rate and manner of the reduction of our forces while being
flexible and generous in the provision of aid.
The following points were also made
(a) The additional aid which would be required for Malaysia and Singapore could not be made available within the total allocation at present availalb e
for our economic
aid.
(b) The balance of advantage lay in not giving any early unattributable
briefing to the press on the lines which had been proposed.
(c) It would be helpful to the further determination of our policy if the
Defence Secretary were to arrange on his forthcoming visit to Malaysia and
Singapore for a team of officials to visit those countries thereafter in
order to prepare a detailed assessment, in consultation with those on the
spot, on what would be involved by the present plans for the reduction of
our forces, both in military terms and in respect of the provision of aid.
(a) Further consideration should be given to the consequences of our
withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia on our economic interests and trade
prospects there.
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