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NUMERICAL COMMITMENT TO WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
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THE FOREIGN SECRETARY recalled that Ministers had previously decided that we should press in the Western European Union (WEU) for
the removal of our commitment under the Revised Brussels Treaty to
keep 55,000 troops on the mainland of Europe. Formal notice of our intention was subsequently given by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Thomson) to the United States and German representatives
at the recent Tripartite meeting in Washington on the Offset Agreement.
The reactions of the Germans and Americans were such as to make it
desirable to review the Government's decision: and those of his colleagues
who were primarily concerned had agreed that in these circumstances he
should raise the matter for discussion now.
The Germans and Americans had made it clear that they would be
opposed to our attempting to eliminate our commitment. While the
United States Government would not be directly concerned in the
renegotiation of the Brussels Treaty which would be involved, their
attitude would certainly be taken into account by all our partners in the
WEU.
The amendments to the Treaty required would need the unanimous consent of the Council of the WEU and subsequent ratification by all
seven Parliaments: it seemed most unlikely that this would be forthcoming.
Furthermore, although we might justify our proposal on the argument that
it would do no more than give us equality of status with the other members
of WEU, who were under no obligation to keep a minimum level of forces
on the mainland of Europe, this argument would be hard to sustain. The Revised Brussels Treaty comprised a series of inter-related commitments
which included a German obligation not to manufacture certain types of
armaments, including nuclear weapons. If we were to seek the removal
of our own commitment, there would be much concern by our allies that this
might lead to the removal of this and other restrictions imposed on
other powers by the Treaty. Despite these difficulties he had raised the
matter that the Federal German Foreign Minister, Herr Brandt, during the
latter's visit during the week but the latter's reaction had been similar
to those of the German representatives in the Tripartite meetings.
In these circumstances the better course would be for us not to
seek at this juncture the removal of the numerical commitment, though
we should keep ourselves free to seek this later, but to seek a reduction
of the commitment sufficient to enable us to withdraw one brigade group in accordance with the agreement which had been reached in the Tripartite
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