TOP SECRET
Page 117
There were
and how to mitigate the consequences of our withdrawal.
moreover objections in the light of our recent experience to fixing
publicly a date so far ahead for the achievement of our objectives without the fullest consideration of their consequences for allies.
Otherwise their presence was likely to necessitate changes in our
publicly declared policy.
THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY referred to his recent visit to Australia
and New Zealand and to the Far East. He had spoken publicly there of the Government's defence policy on the basis of earlier Ministerial state- ments and of the Defence White Paper. The dangers to peace in that area
were greater than in Europe. We night expect to obtain acceptance for a
further reduction of 50 per cent in our forces in Malaysia and Singapore
but the results of removing all our land forces from the area would have
serious consequences for our relations with the United States and with
Australia and New Zealand, who were all most concerned that we should
continue a presence East of Suez. It was doubtful whether the Commonwealth
Brigade would survive if we were to remove our contribution to it; and
our forces in Hong Kong would be isolated. We could also expect that
harassment of our forces on the lines of what had happened in Malta
would occur in Singapore if we reduced our forces otherwise than in agree-
ment with the Singapore Government. If it were decided to proceed on the
basis proposed, any announcement of our intention should be delayed as
long as possible. Any premature announcement or leakage of information would cause grave danage to our relations with our allies. It might
also be advisable that if the Defence Secretary were to visit Malaysia
and Singapore after the SEATO Conference, he should also go to Australia
and New Zealand.
Page 117
TOP SECRET
Page 117