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Such a new approach to our policy in the Far East needed further study to clarify the political and practical problems involved and establish more clearly just what savings would result, and in what time- scale, from adopting it. There were severe practical limitations on the rate at which forces withdrawn from the Far East could be disbanded (about
10,000 a year in addition to the normal wastage for all three services was considered the limit) accommodation had to be provided in this country and
retraining schemes arranged for those who would become redundant before
their engagements were completed. Experience in Malta had shown clearly
that there were also limitations on the rate at which we could damage the
economy in foreign countries by withdrawing troops. We also had to renegotiate commitments. At this stage the need was for broad
approval for a plan on these lines so that it could be worked out in more
detail and so that the process of consultation with our allies could begin.
He wished to start on these in general terms when he met the United States
Secretary for Defence, Mr. McNamara early in April. Thereafter there would be opportunities at the SEATO Conference in Washington (18th-20th April)
and he would like to go on from there to Malaysia and Singapore. From the
dofence point of view, the most important requirement was that in July
final decisions should be announced on the long-term size and shape for
the forces, with a definition of their tasks, that would put an end to
long-standing uncertainties,
THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that he was in general agreement with the Defence Secretary's proposals. Our aim should be to remove our forces
from the mainland of Asia as soon as possible and not to retain commit-
ments for which our forces were inadequate. This would best be done by
moving to a peripheral strategy based on naval and air forces.
His only
reservation was on fixing now a firm date such as 1975-76 for reaching this position. It would be preferable for the date to be flexible so
that if opportunity offered, for example because the war in Vietnam ended, we could leave Singapore/Malaysia earlier. We must not get ourselves into
a position which committed us to stay on the mainland of Asia longer than
we need. Studies should therefore be made on alternative assumptions that we left Singapore and Malaysia by 1975-76 or by some earlier date, and
they should bring out how best to carry our allies with us in our plans
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