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withdrawals if we chose after 1st April 1968, and we should obtain the support of the United States and Germany for our approach to EU to obtain release from our commitments to maintain any specific level of forces in Europe.
should also, subject to further instructions in the light of the initial
reaction of the Germans, put forward the proposal nade by the Chancellor of the Exchequer for the purchase of bonds by Germany in connection with our
development aid. The Ministers concerned should however consider further in
the light of our consultations whether we should make the purchase of bonds a condition of our acceptance of the offset proposals.
The Committee
(1)
(2)
Invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer in consultation with
the Foreign Secretary and after seeking the advice of the British Ambassador in Bonn, to arrange for a request to be made both to the Federal German Economics Minister and to the Federal German Central Bank, that the German banks should purchase £20 million worth of United Kingdom Government Bonds in the context of providing development aid loans from Britain to developing countries, on conditions which provided for the repayment of the bonds when we ourselves received repayment of the loans from the recipient countries.
Subject to further consideration of the Federal German
attitude to the proposal at (1) above, agreed to accept the German and United States offers set out in OPD(67) 23 and the additional United States offer of a further £7 million purchase in the United Kingdom, on the following understandings with the Federal German and United States Governments: (i) We should withdraw one brigade from Germany as soon as
possible after 1st January 1968 and should reserve our right to make further withdrawals after 1st April 1968, when the offset agreement would expire.
(ii) The United States and Federal German Governments would
support our application to EU for release from our present commitments relating to the stationing of forces on the continent of Europe.
Cabinet Office, S..1.
17th March 1967
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