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"On the question of the nature, duration and purpose of our military presence after independence, the point was made that the latest intelligence assessment was that the United Arab Republic certainly would not launch a military invasion of South Arabia so long as we remained there; although she was unlikely to do so willingly even after our departure, she might find it politically impossible to avoid intervening, particularly if invited by a faction
from inside South Arabia."
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further consideration should be given to maintaining our presence with naval forces off shore, possibly including a commando carrier and an
aircraft carrier.
In discussion of the possibility of persuading the President of
the United Arab Republic, President Nasser, to end the Egyptian-inspired
and supported terrorist campaign in South Arabia, it was suggested that
there might be advantage in arranging a meeting with President Nasser,
provided that he agreed first to end the terrorist campaign. On the other hand it was argued that he was most unlikely, in view of his wider
ambitions in the area, to agree to end the terrorist campaign as a
pre-condition to talks on South Arabia, or perhaps even to carry out
any such agreement subsequently; in any event extreme care should be taken about any approach to him while terrorism continued in South Arabia. Any
public statement of the intention to have discussions with President Nasser
would have a disastrous effect, not only on the Federal Government in
South Arabia and other friendly Governments in the Middle East, but also
on the morale of our forces and the civil administration in Aden.
Greater prospects of success lay in persuading one or more of the
nationalist groups in Aden to co-operate with us. Meanwhile we should
adopt the measures proposed by the Foreign Secretary in paragraph 7 of OPD(67) 18 for dealing with the terrorist threat. The point was however
made that the proposed jamming of the Egyptian-controlled radio was a
departure from our normal policy of not jamming hostile broadcasts; on
the other hand, the Egyptian broadcasts that would be jammed were being
used not only for propaganda but also to direct subversive operations in
South Arabia and it would not be necessary to make use of BBC facilities
for jamming in this case.
The Committee
(1)
Agreed that the granting of independence to South Arabia
should be advanced to 1st November 1967 and that on this date all rights of sovereignty and protection in South Arabia should cease; the necessary legislation should be prepared and passed before the Summer Recess.
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