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from mortar fire unless security in the sorrounding area, which
included the isthmus separating Aden itself from the mainland was
assured. If the Federal forces were unable to establish the necessary
control in this area, British forces would have to move in for their own protection and, in these circumstances, we could hardly avoid being implicated in the actions of the Federal Government in countering the internal security situation. Our presence in Khormaksar could
also prejudice acceptance of the newly independent state by the United Nations. Furthermore, it would be difficult to withdraw our
forces at the time stipulated if the area were then in chaos. The
independent state would never be capable of defending itself adequately
against external aggression by the Egyptian forces in the Yemen, and
we should be pressed to retain our forces there beyond the agreed date
if, as was likely, the threat were not removed. Also, if we were to
implement our obligation to defend the Federation against external
aggression with forces stationed on its territory we should require a base on land and should have to negotiate some form of defence agreement.
The only way of avoiding the need to establish a base of this sort
appeared to be to decide to meet external aggression not defensively
but by retaliation through air attacks on targets in the Yemen or
Egyptian supply ships. The military implications of the Foreign
Secretary's proposals therefore needed further study.
In discussion there was general agreement that the best hope of achieving our objective of an orderly withdrawal lay in the proposals
for the timing of independence made by the Foreign Secretary. While we
had no vital interests in the area, and we might not necessarily be
damaged if eventually South Arabia fell under Egyptian domination, it
was certainly not in our interests or consistent with our responsibilities
either to leave chaos behind when we withdrew or to allow the United
Arab Republic to take South Arabia over immediately on independence.
Still less should we seek to make arrangements with the United Arab
Republic to this end in advance. Our friends elsewhere in the Middle
East, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran, would be gravely disturbed
if we were to follow such a course, and our standing in the world
generally would suffer. Since we had no alternative to supporting the present Federal Government, we must do all that we could to keep them
AND together, while attempting to broaden their base, for this reason alone we should agree to give South Arabia some military support against external aggression for a period after independence. While it was by
no means certain that the independent state would be accepted into the United Nations or for that matter it would survive, the new timetable provided the best chance of achieving this.
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