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the plan was to give the Federal Government a chance to bring the
situation in Aden under control before independence and to deter the
United Arab Republic from launching external aggression for a few
months after independence.
The plan also aimed to improve the chances
of South Arabia obtaining recognition by the United Nations. If the
original independence date of 1st January 1968 was adhered to, there was no prospect that admission to the United Nations could be arranged
before the autumn of 1968, and therefore no possibility of United Nations' protection against external aggression. The new timetable would however permit an application for membership during the autumn 1967 session of the General Assembly. These proposals carried a risk that the period during which we should not have internal responsibility
for the affairs of South Arabia, but would in fact be still considered responsible for the situation, would be extended; but the proposals originally approved by the Committee in November 1966 involve
similar difficulties.
Success depended to a considerable extent on broadening the base
of the Federal Government to include other elements in South Arabia, especially the nationalists, and on the extent to which the United Nations Mission, which would be visiting Aden in the near future, could
be persuaded to work with the Federal authorities. He was following
up indications that opponents of the Federation, particularly al-Asnag of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), might
abandon their terrorist activities and co-operate with the United
Nations Mission. He was also considering how to strengthen the
overloaded civil administration in Aden for the difficult months ahead.
THE DEFENCE SECRETARY said that he supported the proposals of the
Foreign Secretary on the date of independence and surrender of sovereignty
over Aden.
It was necessary to avoid the total collapse of Government in South Arabia, while our troops remained there. There were great
advantages in bringing forward the date of independence to coincide with
the date when we handed over responsibility for Aden. However, the particular
proposals for a military presence after independence posed considerable
difficulties. The Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, was not confident
that the Federal forces would be able to control the internal security
situation in Aden on 1st November. There were doubts about the loyalty
as well as the efficiency of the Federal regular army. If, our forces
were to have the capability of resisting external aggression, they would
have to be located on Khormaksar airfield, which could not be protected
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