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On our
detailed discussions on this aspect would not be between Governments but between the Ministry of Defence as employers and (as regards civilian employees) the unions; the Maltese were anxious that these discussions should take place at the same time as the principal negotiations. side, we should stross in the negotiations our desire to work with the Maltese in creating new opportunities of employment and we should seek to
persuade the Maltese that their assessment of the employment consequences
of our run-down was over pessimistic. Should the talks show signs of foundering we should not hesitate to point out to the Maltese that if no
agreement could be reached we should withdraw all our forces and, while we
would not necessarily terminate all economic aid, there could be no
guarantee of its continuance on the present scale.
In general discussion, concern was expressed at the possibility of our
being induced to offer the Maltese yet further concessions which would be
costly not only in financial terms but also in terms of our defence
redeployment. Already we had offered concessions which would mean that we
should fall considerably short of the whole of the savings for which we had
originally hoped. An extension of the defence run-down into the fifth year
would further diminish the expected defence savings; we should concentrate the discussions on rephasing within the present planned four-year period, offering as little as possible in respect of an extension into the fifth year,
Otherwise there was a risk of our ending the dispute with Malta by obtaining
little saving and the maximum of opprobrium. It was also important that we
should not allow the negotiations to drag on, but should aim at concluding
them within, say, one week.
made
In discussion of particular items the following additional points were
(a) Defence run-down. The extension of the run-down into the fifth year
would involve retaining one of the two infantry battalions in Malta, at a cost which was estimated at £14 million for a full year.
The
However, the further retention of an infantry battalion in Malta should not
be considered in isolation from the other measures of rephasing listed in the report by officials. There were many permutations, which varied in cost, in
the resulting rate of redundancy, and in their military implications.
proposals described in the report by officials offered an even spread of
redundancy over the four-year period, and were the least disadvantageous
militarily: their cost was a little over £4 million. It would be possible
to devise a rephasing which extended into the fifth year at no greater perhaps even lesser cost; conversely a rephasing that pushed all the redundancy back into the fourth year but offered no extension int the fifth
year would be substantially nore expensive. Our aim should be to offer
concessions in respect of the defence run-d wn only a little at a time.
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