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was opposed to any rundown of forces for at least two years, and with the
leader of the Opposition in Malta, Dr. Mintoff, who professed to be glad
to see a full withdrawal of British forces. Hence the present trouble
in Malta following the announcement of our final plans came as no surprise.
The harassment of our forces would no doubt be intensified after the repeal
of the Visiting Forces Act had been enacted in two days' time.
It was
plain that we could not hope to stay in Malta on the basis of the present
planned withdrawal for another four years. Two courses were open to us.
One was the withdrawal of our forces now, using force to the extent
necessary to achieve withdrawal. The alternative was to authorise the
High Commissioner to propose further talks with Dr. Olivier as indicated
by the Defence Secretary; in them we should also discuss the proposed dry dock (for which an excellent naval site already existed) and the possibility of a free port. It was impossible to be certain that the Maltese would
accept a proposal for talks on this basis; but there seemed a good prospect
that they would do so.
In discussion it was recognised that these proposals might set an
embarrassing precedent but it was the general view that on a balance of
our interests our best course was to seek further discussions with
Dr. Olivier on the basis proposed by the Commonwealth and Defence
Secretaries. It was important that these should be put to Dr. Olivier as
talks not primarily about the rephasing of the reduction of our forces but about assisting Melta with the economic consequences.
There was reason
to think that the Malta Government, with the support of the Opposition, was ready to take action in respect of the dockyard (which was at present costing us over million a year). Importance was attached to the dry
dock proposal, which would offer an immediate prospect of constructional
work for 2,000. While the rephasing of the reductions would be a necessary
part of our offer, we should offer no further concession on the defence reduction beyond rephasing within the four year period/we should start the negotiations with a minimum offer. It was noted that the possible range
of adjustments to the present programme for the rundown would cost from
1.2 million to rather more than £3 million over a period of four years.
This compared with the maximum possible saving over the four year period
of £28 million, less £5 million which we had foregone through the rephasing
already offered. In making our offer to Dr. Olivier attention should be
paid to publicity; any public announcement should be made simultaneously
on Malta and the United Kingdom. It was also the general view that in
discussions on the reduction of our forces in other oversea theatres,
it Comme was important to draw the appropriate inferences from the ease of events dn Malta. We should for example start any such negotiations by offering no concessions in respect of our own requirements, and not display our
willingness to make concessions till a later stage.
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