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As regards overseas expenditure the rate would be reduced by £75 million,
excluding Germany, by the end of the next financial year and there were fir
contracts or acceptances valued at £50 million against the F 111 offset
agreement. Strengths overseas outside Europe would be reduced by 25,000 out of 100,000 by the end of 1968, 6,000 families would be brought home and the
Brigade of Ghurkas would be reduced in strength by 5,000.
The paragraphs setting out our view of NATO strategy were intended to
provide a firm basis for discussion with our allies and to stimulate public
discussion. It was clear from the decision on German offset payments that
some withdrawals of forces from Germany would be essential: it was also clear that
a worth while strategy in Europe was possible with smaller forces, particularly
in view of the changed Soviet attitudes and of the reinforcement that would
be possible in the period of political warning that we could reasonably
expect to have. In any event the fact had to be faced that, even with
existing forces, it would not be possible to contain a major Soviet attack
for more than three or four days. The use of tactical nuclear weapons would only extend this for a further two or three days before strategic weapons hed to be used. The only alternatives to this process were surrender or
the provision of much larger conventional forces which neither we nor our
allies were in a position, or willing, to provide, We must reach agreement
with our allies on this view of NATO strategy or we should have to make
unilateral decisions to withdraw forces.
On a smaller point, it would be desirable to add a paragraph to the draft on the stability which had now been achieved on the military aircraft
programme and the consequential advantage to the industry.
In discussion doubts were expressed on the wisdom of publishing at the
present time a White Paper on the lines proposed, particularly as there had
been insufficient time for Ministers to assess its wide repercussions. Although the paragraphs dealing with NATO strategy took a similar line to that which our representatives had been pressing with our NATO allies and although
much of the ground had been covered at various times in earlier Statements
on Defence and in debates in Parliament, the material had never before been
set out in such forthright terms in a public statement of policy. It could
be expected to bring very sharp reactions in NATO and, because of its clear
acceptance of our reliance on the strategic nuclear power of the NATO Alliance,
in Parliament and in the country. Furthermore the timing of the statement
should be considered in relation to the forthcoming visit of the Soviet
Prime Minister, Mr. Kosygin. There was general agreement that the section
of the White Paper dealing with the revision of NATO strategy should be
considerably shortened and brought more in accord with the less forthright
statement in the previous White Paper.
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