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STATIONING OF A SECOND BATTALION IN THE PERSIAN GULF (SHARJAH)
(Previous Reference: OPD(66) 48th Meeting, Item 1)
The Committee considered a memorandum by the Foreign and Defence
Secretaries (OPD(67) 1) about the stationing of a second battalion in
the Persian Gulf at Sharjah.
!
THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that, at its meeting on 9th December, the
Committee had asked for an urgent review of the decision taken in February 1966 during the course of the Defence Review to add a second
battalion to our forces in the Persian Gulf and to station it at Sharjah,
After reviewing the matter accordingly he and the Defence Secretary
recommended that the decision, which was closely related in both a military
and political sense to our withdrawal from Aden, should be confirmed.
From the military point of view there would be serious risk in maintaining
less than two battalions in the Persian Gulf as long as our present
commitments remained. If there were disturbances which required the use of
British troops at short notice and in more than one place at a time, two
battalions was the minimum force likely to be adequate. After we had
left iden the second battalion could, unless it were posted in the area,
only come from the United Kingdom and would need acclimatisation on
arrival to be effective. This delay might result in a further deter-
ioration of the situation to a point where the second battalion was not an
adequate reinforcement. To reverse the decision at this stage would not
only be to incur these risks, but would furthermore be interpreted as a
major reversal of policy foreshadowing an earlier abandonment of our
position in the Gulf with consequent damaging consequences for our
relations with friendly powers in this area. Although he had not been
enthusiastic about the decision at the time of the Defence Review, it could not now be reversed without unacceptable damage to our interests.
The possibility that in consequence of the further defence studies we
might seek to make an early withdrawal from the whole area would not be prejudiced by confirming the earlier decision. Admittedly the expenditure involved would in the event of such a withdrawal not then serve any purpose, but it would preserve qur position and interest meanwhile. general while we should soek to withdraw from the area, we could only
do so slowly.
In
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