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impose a Chief against their wishes. Other members of the ruling family
are unsuitable for various reasons.
7.
Tshekedi has ambitions to re-assert his authority in the Reserve, and he would be prepared to see the Chieftainship abolished to further his ambitions. But the High Commissioner considers that the Chieftainship is essential to the Bechuana tribes in their present stage of development and I feel that it would be undesirable to take any initiative which would under - mine this traditional form of government in the other seven native reserves.
8. I am therefore fortified in my belief that we must continue our present policy of support for Rasebolai as Native Authority, even though it may be a long and difficult process to persuade the tribe to accept him as Chief. There is some risk that Rasebolai might become discouraged and resign from his position as Native Authority, but the High Commissioner has advised that he does not think it likely provided we continue to give him our full support.
9. If Seretse were prepared to surrender his claim to the Chieftainship, this would, of course, greatly strengthen Rasebolai's position. I do not think Seretse is likely to do this however, He told the Parliamentary Under- Secretary last December that he lived in the hope that the Government might change their policy or that, with a change of Government, he might one day be allowed to return. Mr. James Griffiths, as leader of the deputation from the Executive Committee of the Labour Party which came to see me in August, told me that he believed Seretse might be willing to "abdicate" for the good of his people. But he and his colleagues were not prepared to
allow me to disclose that I understood from them that this was the case, And in any case he made it clear that Seretse could not be expected to do this until he had had an opportunity to discuss the whole Bamangwato question at the proposed meeting of tribal leaders in London and until he had been permitted to return to Serowe as Chief in order to make his renunciation among his own people. These conditions are clearly unacceptable.
10. I have considered the possibility of approaching Seretse myself to ascertain whether he had any intention of resigning his claim and would be prepared to do so without returning to Africa. I am reluctant to do this as it would certainly become known and would be represented as an attempt by Her Majesty's Government to put pressure on him and as a sign that we were playing from weakness, I cannot pretend to be happy about the situation but I see no alternative to continuing our present policy of giving all possible support to Rasebolai and of dealing firmly with any attempts to stir up trouble in the Reserve, At the same time we must stand firmly by our decision that Seretse cannot return to Bechuanaland until an alternative Chief has been securely established.
11.
To put this problem in perspective, the total population of the Bechuanaland Protectorate is 300, 000, and the total population of the Bamangwato Reserve 100, 000; 80,000 of the latter are subject peoples, who are indeed affected by this dispute, but only 20,000 are true Bamangwato who are directly and intimately concerned.
Commonwealth Relations Office, S.W.1.
2nd December, 1955,
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H.
Page 184
Zoz
(THIS DOCRAGEN If THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJPage 185ONMENT)
CONFIDENTIAL
C.P,(55) 191
5th December, 1955
CABINET
COPY NO.
68
PALESTINIANS IN THE CANAL ZONE
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs
There are some 700 Palestinian employees (plus their dependants) who have served with the British forces in the Canal Zone for varying periods and who lack the necessary documents for continued residence in Egypt. As our forces leave the Canal Zone they are being discharged. The Egyptian Government regard them as being illegally present in Egypt, but are prepared to allow any who can be employed elsewhere to leave without hindrance. The Egyptians intend to deport the remainder to the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip.
2.
Various proposals for finding employment for these Palestinians have been examined but, although seven have been taken on by the Arab Legion and a small number who were "compromised" and whose lives might have been in danger, if they had been allowed to fall into the hands of the Egyptians, have been accepted by Cyprus, it has not so far been possible to arrange anything for the majority. The Government of Cyprus have been asked whether they could agree to take more than they have already done and their final reply is still awaited. Officials of the Foreign Office, Home Office and Ministry of Labour have also discussed whether 114 of them, who have more than four years' service, could be brought to the United Kingdom. It appears, however, that most of them do not want to come to this country.
3.
These Palestinians are in the first instance the responsibility of the War Office who do not consider that they are under any obligation to do more than to pay them gratuities. But to abandon these men who have given Britain long and loyal service, sometimes in difficult conditions, to the miseries of a refugee camp, will prejudice our reputation in the Arab world. It may also lead to criticism by other United Nations countries on the ground that we are aggravating the refugee problem at a time when we are stressing in the Assembly the importance of providing the existing refugees with work.
4. The problem is becoming very urgent, since the period is now approaching when dismissals will attain their maximum frequency. I think we should therefore take a very early decision on this matter. In my view the only practicable solution is that all those who have more than four years' service and are willing to sign on again, and as many as possible of the remainder who have less than four years' service, should be re-engaged by the Service Departments for service in Cyprus, and eventually elsewhere in the Middle East if that is practicable. I recommend that my colleagues should endorse this view.