7.

(a)

Page 120 The plan for the evacuation from Hong Kong of

British and Chinese residents, in the event of an attack by China, will be very largely frustrated since a force of one brigade group cannot be expected to hold an attack long enough to make orderly evacuation possible.

(b) The life of Hong Kong depends on confidence.

Frequent Ministerial statements have been made to the effect that Her Majesty's Govern- ment intend to maintain their position in Hong Kong, and the presence of considerable British forces in the Colony has given substance to these statements. A reduction in these forces, however circumspectly carried out, is bound in due course to become widely known, and only too likely to be taken as reflecting a less confident view of the Colony's future.

(c) Even more serious would be the effect on Asian

and world opinion generally. In the Colonial Secretary's opinion, it is too soon to judge whether the apparent easing of international tension is real or will endure; and a reduction in the Hong Kong garrison at this time would be interpreted as a weakening of our determination to resist aggression by the Chinese, or at least as a premature acceptance of a change in Chinese intentions.

(d) The reduction of the garrison to a point where it could offer no effective resistance to a coup by Chinese military forces could offer a dangerous temptation. The Chinese Government might well estimate that seizure of the Colony with compara- tively little blood-shed would not necessarily involve them in full war.

In discussion at the Defence Committee, the point was made that the real defence of Hong Kong lies not in the strength of the garrison, which, even at its present level could not repel an outright attack, but in the realisation by the Chinese that such an attack would precipitate a full-scale war. As to the psychological effect in Hong Kong and else- where in Asia of a reduction in the garrison, opinions will obviously differ.

8.

The Commanders-in-Chief have also put forward similar arguments to those in sub-paragraphs 6(a), (b) and (c) above against reduction of the garrison, and made the further point that a reduced garrison could not deal with infiltration over the border as well as maintain internal security. Nevertheless the Chiefs of Staff, having considered this point, confirmed their recommendation that the garrison should be reduced to the forces required for internal security. I support their recommendation. We cannot afford to be strong everywhere, and the current examination of our long terra defence programme shows that it is essential to reduce our overseas commitments wherever possible.

Page 12048 size every opportunity to reduce our foes aboats the

minimum necessary to meet our long-term commitments, and I believe

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122B

Pagbathopoent situation in the Far East makes fijsk

to put this policy into practice in the case of Hong Kong.

9.

The least obtrusive way of carrying out a reduction would be to withdraw units as they become due for relief at intervals over a long period. Annex III contains a tentative programme for the reduction of the garrison in all arms to the level required for internal security, should the Cabinet so decide. These plans could not for long be kept from becorning general knowledge in the Colony. It may, however, be possible to allay local apprehension by stressing our policy of holding strategic reserves and our ability at need to reinforce.

Recommendation

10.

I invite the Cabinet:

(a) to agree that the garrison of Hong Kong should be

reduced to those forces required for internal security, as shown in Annex II and that plans should be made accordingly;

(b) to approve provisionally a programme for this

reduction on the lines of that suggested in Annex III;

(c) to approve the withdrawal of a field artillery

regiment in January, 1956, and a British battalion in August, 1956.

Ministry of Defence, S. W.1.

15th November, 1955.

ARMY

ANNEX I

GARRISON OF HONG KONG

Major Units, October 1955

Armoured

Armoured Regiments

Artillery

Field Regiments

S.L.

1

Medium Regiments

Light Anti-Aircraft Regiments Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiments

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