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circumstances however is that we dare not risk discussion with the French and Germans or even with our other European allies before the vote for fear of leakages which might have an adverse effect on its result.
11. In any such initiative we should I think be guided by two main principles. We should find some legal means of re-establishing the link between the Saar and Western European Union which would have existed had the Statute been adopted. This might involve giving the Saar a European status similar to that envisaged in the Statute, but subject to review after a fixed period, say five years, instead of being tied to the Greek Kalends of a German peace treaty. It might also entail the continuation of the Referendum Commission in being for a period, or the early appointment to the Saar of a European Commissioner with approximately the same powers as the Commissioner provided for in the Statute (foreign affairs, defence and certain internal functions).
12. Secondly there should be adequate safeguards for democratic principles in the Saar. This means that the pro-German parties and newspapers should not be suppressed, provided that they themselves preserve the democratic decencies, and that free elections for a new Landtag should be held at a very early date instead of waiting for 1957 as would otherwise normally be the case.
13. No solution based on these principles will be at all welcome to the French, The essence of the problem will be to convince them that some such answer is far better for France than any of the other alternatives. In view of the present internal situation in France, we should be deluding ourselves if we expected to be able to reach a definitive agreement on the Saar with any French Government likely to be formed before the elections to the National Assembly due next spring. The immediate problem will therefore be to find some means of holding the situation. Even after the French elections any compromise solution would be bound to encounter very serious difficulties both in Paris and in Saarbrücken. Nevertheless I consider that the two principles which I have set out above are the most useful signposts for action, and I should be grateful for discretion from my colleagues to proceed in that sense.
Situation if the Referendum favours
the Statute
14. The position after a positive vote will be simpler, particularly in view of Herr Hoffmann's announcement that the Landtag elections foreseen in the Statute will in fact be held as early as 4th December. True there will be a danger that the pro-German parties, disappointed at the result of the Referendum, and unwilling to wait for the Landtag elections to register their disapproval of Herr Hoffmann, may proceed to more or less violent action. Here again the absence of an inter- national police force will mean that French troops might have to inter- vene if the Saar police cannot maintain order. This would be likely to undo most of the good to Franco-German relations resulting from a successful adoption of the Statute.
15. An important safeguard would be the installation of a European Commissioner at Saarbrücken as soon as the Referendum results are confirmed with authority to act on behalf of Western European Union to Page 3 of 3e situation calm.
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-3.