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(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)
SECRET
C.P.(55) 159
19th October, 1955
CABINET
COPY NO. b5
THE SAAR REFERENDUM
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Historical Introduction
The Saar formed part of the Zone of Occupation allotted in 1945 to the French Government, who with British and United States acquiescence took various steps to cut it off from the rest of their Zone, and to bring it into a special relationship with France.
Herr
2. Elections to a Saar Landtag were held in October, 1947 on a basis laid down by the French Occupying Power in consultation with a constitutional commission consisting of Saarlanders nominated by them. The constitutional commission then submitted to the new Landtag a draft Constitution which was approved in November, 1947. It provided that France should be responsible for the defence of the Saar and the representation of its interests abroad, while a democratically constituted Saar Government should be autonomous in internal affairs. Hoffmann, who had formed the first Saar Government after the 1947 elections, was again returned to power in the next Landtag elections of November, 1952. The recently formed pro-German parties were not allowed to take part in the elections of 1952 or to engage in other political activities. During this phase a separate Saar nationality was created by a law of the Landtag passed on 15th July, 1948, and the territory's economic links with France were tightened up.
3.
Negotiations between the French and German Governments began in February, 1952, to try to find a mutually satisfactory modification of the present regime, and these led ultimately to the Franco-German Agreement of 23rd October, 1954, embodying the Saar Statute. A subsequent Franco-German agreement of June, 1955, provided that the pro-German parties would be free to take part in the campaign for the Referendum on the Statute, which is to be held on 23rd October, 1955.
4. Her Majesty's Government, for their part, during the period after the war supported the French view that the Saar should be politically detached from Germany and economically linked with France, subject always to the final peace settlement. Her Majesty's Government did however avoid giving any very directly binding and formal commitment in this sense. It is thus open to us, if we wish, to argue from the principle of rebus sic stantibus that, since our general assurances of support were given in the years immediately after the war, there have Page 290f 924 factors to be taken into account, most notably the ofgqqsity
to consider the wishes of the Saar population. This principle has been
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Paghed in recent statements by Her Majesty's GBvefnhelfte!g.
the Prime Minister's reply to a Parliamentary Question on 9th March). It is also embodied in the Saar Statute and is thus endorsed by the French and German Governments.
5.
Situation if the Referendum goes
against the Statute
Although the French remain confident of a positive vote, other observers in the Saar agree that a negative majority is more likely. If so, the Franco-German Agreement of 23rd October, 1954, will fall to the ground, and the legal situation will revert to that set out in paragraph 2 above.
6. The French have made it clear that they intend to stand on that position. Similarly Herr Hoffmann has said that if the Statute is rejected his Government will not be bound to hold further elections until the present Landtag's normal term, i, e. 1957. The pro-German parties in the Saar are however unlikely to take this lying down, and still less to submit tamely to being suppressed, and having their newspapers closed down, as Herr Hoffmann might claim that he was legally entitled to do as part of the return to the status quo ante. We should thus have a position of deadlock, with the majority of the Saar population indignantly opposed to their Government, but lacking any means of constitutional self-expression until the Landtag elections of 1957. In these circumstances the incitement which can be expected from non-official German organisations across the border would create an explosive situation, with possibilities of strikes, unrest and violence.
7.
Since however the French have now vetoed the sending of an international police force, there will be nothing but French troops left to help the inadequate Saar police keep order in the territory. The French would be perfectly within their rights under the Franco-Saar Convention of 1953 if, in response to a request from the Saar Government, they sent in troops to keep order. The French Ambassador here has said tha they would in fact do so in an emergency.
8. The use of French troops against Saarlanders would cause a strong emotional reaction in the Federal Republic. We might thus find ourselves with the beginnings of a major Franco-German row just when the Geneva Conference was starting, i, e. at the moment when the unity of the Western side was especially important, and moreover at a time when diplomatic relations between Moscow and Bonn were on the point of being established.
9. In the event of a negative vote in the Referendum it is therefore clear that.speed will be an essential factor, i. e. it will be more useful to arrive quickly at a provisional solution which will lower the political temperature than to try and go straight to a radical solution which will inevitably take time to find.
10. The view of Her Majesty's Government, publicly expressed on a number of occasions, is that the Saar question is primarily one for direct Franco-German negotiation. As, however, such negotiation is most unlikely to yield quick results in the circumstances expected after the Referendum, my colleagues may feel that the United Kingdom should be ready to take a prompt initiative as soon as it becomes clear that the PagofeOhafs3@dne against the Statute. A serious difficulRage Ree€321.
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