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C.P.(55) 153
15th October, 1955
CABINET
SURAIMI
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
16
The dispute with Saudi Arabia over Buraimi was submitted to arbitration under an Anglo/Saudi Agreement of July, 1954. From the outset the Saudi Arabian Government have disregarded many of the conditions of the arbitration, notably by a campaign of wholesale bribery in the area, When Her Majesty's Government brought charges of corruption before the Arbitration Tribunal last month at Geneva it became apparent that Saudi bribery had extended to the Tribunal itself. The Saudi member, Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, was shown to be fully implicated in the bribery, which in fact he organised, and the Pakistani member of the Tribunal accepted Saudi bribes. As a result of this the British member, and subsequently the Belgian President of the Tribunal, resigned.
2.
The wishes of the inhabitants of the disputed areas form a major factor in the arbitration, and, in the opinion of my legal advisers, Saudi attempts to influence the inhabitants by bribery have now gone so far that even an uncorrupted tribunal would be likely to reach a decision against us. Nor could we be sure that a new tribunal would be any more proof against Saudi bribery than the last one. The only conclusion we can reach is that Saudi actions have rendered the Aribtration Agreement unworkable and have shown that Saudi Arabia is incapable of carrying out the conditions of a genuine international arbitration. Arbitration having failed, I doubt whether we can safely entrust the matter to any other form of international decision or negotiation, especially as in the meantime the processes of Saudi corruption in the area would continue unchecked, The only safe course now is to rely upon a position of strength on the ground.
3.
This involves re-occupying those parts of the disputed area to which we consider our claim really sound and which are vital to our interests and those of our client Rulers, letting the rest go and standing pat on that position. This is the method we adopted earlier in the year in dealing with the Aden Protectorate and Muscat frontiers with Saudi Arabia. In these cases we made a unilateral assertion of a reasonable and moderate line, with a view to defending that line and refusing to negotiate or discuss it in any way. The line we have in mind will in fact mean not occupying some territory to which the Ruler of Abu Dhabi has strong claims which we have emphasised in the Arbitration proceedings so far. We should make propaganda capital out of this forbearance, and so word it that our legal case would not be prejudiced if we ever again had to submit our claim for judicial settlement. We should also offer to make any minor frontier rectifications that might be shown to be necessary.
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Page 15f32bposal in the present case is that Hdage5f321 Government should announce that the Arbitration Agreement has been vitiated by Saudi malpractices, and must be regarded as terminated, and that the forces of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi (for whose foreign relations we are responsible) should reoccupy the disputed area up to a given line in the Western part of the disputed areas. Our Trucial Oman Levies would support them and repel any Saudi incursion by force. Subject to the views of the Chiefs of Staff, which are being urgently sought, this should not present a serious military problem, provided that our forces had authority to take offensive air action in case of need and provided also that Saudi Arabia did not treat the matter as a major operation of war, which is unlikely.
5.
In the Buraimi Casis, which is much the most important part of the disputed area, the problem is more complicated. The retention of this Oasis is essential to our position in south-east Arabia. Whoever controls Buraimi can dominate the British-protected Trucial States and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, where we believe that big oil deposits lie within easy reach of the Indian Ocean. If the saudis were to get control of Buraimi we should be regarded as having betrayed the Rulers for whom we are acting and the value of British protection would slump heavily all the way from Kuwait to Aden. The consequences of this on our position in the Persian Gulf and throughout the Middle East would be very grave.
6. A difficulty is that the Exchange of Notes attached to the Arbitration Agreement allowed the Saudis to station in the Buraimi Zone a police group of fifteen men. If these men are warned of our proposed action they and their leader will take refuge in the village of Hamasa and organise the inhabitants, who are pro-Saudi, to withstand a siege. The blockade of 1953/54 would then have to be resumed, with its nightly firing at blockade runners and its frequent casualties. This would be intolerable. It will therefore be essential to overpower these men without warning. This is of course a high-handed action, but the Saudis have disregarded several of the conditions under which these policemen are stationed in the oasis, and we should use these infringements as the justification for our action.
7.
It would also be necessary for the Muscat authorities to resume control of Hamasa. Safe conduct and transport would have to be provided for such Saudi adherents as wished to return to Saudi Arabia, and subsidies would have to be given for a while to those who resume their allegiance to Muscat. The Saudis have been subsidising the inhabitants of the village for several years. The financial commitment would be of the order of 25,000.
8.
This action will be regarded as highly provocative by Saudi Arabia and probably by a large section of the Arab world. We shall be accused of exchanging force for pacific settlement, and the matter may well be taken before the United Nations. If that happened, we should have a case that we had been supporting the interests of independent small Arab States against Saudi imperialism. The internal conditions of Saudi Arabia are not stable and this is not a bad moment to force a showdown. Saudi reputation is low, even in the Arab world. The United States, whose influence might be decisive in any United Nations debate, have a natural in- stinct to appease the Saudis on account of the interests of the American Oil Company, Aramco, It would be necessary to convince the United States Gov- erBagatthof 32this matter Her Majesty's GovernmePage15 aftBlunder the spur of vital economic needs and not in any spirit of colonialism, and to inform them slightly in advance of our intention.
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