Printed for the Cabinet. July 1952
Page 201
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SECRET
C. (52) 232
CABINET OFFICE RECORD COPY
Copy No.78
8th July 1952
CABINET
HANDLING OF COLONIAL QUESTIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS: THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
At the last Session of the Assembly some of the anti-colonial Powers tried to establish the right of the United Nations to discuss the political affairs of colonies, and to assert, at least by implication, that Administering Powers are accountable to the United Nations for the administration of their colonies. If such a principle were established our position as an Administering Power would be seriously impaired.
2. Our best hope of diverting the General Assembly from such courses is to increase our general influence and that of other moderate members. Our policy is to keep down the temperature in debates, to make reasonable and constructive contributions and to present our policies in a clear and positive manner. Approaches through diplomatic channels have also a useful influence on certain countries.
3. These methods, however, take time to bear fruit. Other methods must be considered of dealing with attempts which may well be made at the forthcoming Seventh Session of the General Assembly to establish principles which would impair our ability to maintain our position in the colonies. (There is attached at Annex A a note of the main principles which we cannot afford to see established.)
4. We must therefore be prepared to consider the possibility of threatening to withdraw and, if necessary, actually withdrawing from any proceedings in the Assembly arising out of a decision to discuss matters of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 above, particularly in cases where no other redress is open to us (e.g., . (a) and (b) (ii) and (iii) of Annex A).
5. In favour of this course it may be said:
(i) The French and Belgian Governments, which are our closest allies in
these matters, are strongly in favour of it.
(ii) A threat of withdrawal proved effective during the Sixth Session of the General Assembly in helping to avert the passage of a resolution affirm- ing the right of the Fourth Committee (which deals with matters relating to trust and non-self-governing territories) to discuss the political affairs of non-self-governing territories.
(iii) It might make States which proposed to discuss matters of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 hesitate if they knew that in those circum- stances we (and those who think like us) should withdraw.
6. On the other hand:
(a) It is arguable that withdrawal is not by itself a sanction at all. However much we dislike the proceedings, our withdrawal might well fail to arrest them. It might, for example, be decided to hear oral petitioners, e.g., from Cyprus, even in our absence. During the last session of the Assembly both the South African and French Delegations (for different reasons) staged withdrawals which were ineffective. Yet once they found we were prepared to do the same they (or the Belgians) might well press us to join in some similar demonstrations for their benefit which we would find awkward to refuse.
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