2

Page 8 their essential interests and way of life of which they can have little conception. Faced with this choice, the British people might be rallied to a greater productive effort which would enable a greater volume of external commitments to be borne.

Withdrawal from Obligations.

6. There are very strong arguments against a complete abandonment of a major commitment. First, in the present state of world tension, unless arrangements. have been made for the burden to be transferred to friendly shoulders, the Russians would be only too ready to fill any vacuum created by a British withdrawal, with a consequent shifting of the balance of power against the West. It is further obvious that when an area falls into Communist hands its economic and trading value to the Western world becomes greatly reduced while Western capital assets are liquidated with little or no compensation.

7. Secondly, withdrawal from a major commitment would affect the inter- national status of the United Kingdom. By reducing the value of the United Kingdom as a partner and ally, it would undermine the cohesion of the Common- wealth and the special relationship of the United Kingdom with the United States and its European partners and other allies. Their attitude towards us will depend largely upon our status as a world Power and upon their belief that we are ready and willing to support them. It is evident that in so far as we reduce our commit- ments and our power declines, our claim to the leadership of the Commonwealth, to a position of influence in Europe, and to a special relationship with the United States will be, pro tanto, diminished.

8. Thirdly, the British world position brings with it concurrent and beneficial results of an economic and financial nature. The abandonment of our position in any area of the world may well have similar concurrent and adverse effects on our economic and trading interests.

9. Finally, there is the general effect of loss of prestige. It is impossible to assess in concrete terms the consequences to ourselves and the Commonwealth of our drastically and unilaterally reducing our responsibilities; the effects of a failure of will and relaxation of grip in our overseas commitments are incalculable. But once the prestige of a country has started to slide there is no knowing where it will stop.

Classification of Obligations

10. The same reasoning applies to a lesser extent to a policy of reduction and sharing of obligations. It is, therefore, essential that this policy should be contrived in such a manner and applied in such areas as to do the least harm to the world. position of the United Kingdom. In order to determine where, if anywhere, our responsibilities could be diminished, it is now necessary to survey our existing obligations.

+

11. These fall broadly into three categories—-

(a) Obligations arising from the geographical position of the British Isles.

(b) Obligations arising from our imperial heritage.

(c) Obligations arising from our international position.

12. (a) Obligations arising from the geographical position of the British Isles-

Defence of the United Kingdom and Western Europe.

Preservation of sea and air communications.

Membership of N.A.T.O.

Maintenance of forces on the Continent.

(b) Obligations arising from our Imperial Heritage

Page 8

Maintenance of security and economic and social development in British

Colonial territories.:

General support for other Commonwealth countries.

Defence of the British position in Egypt and responsibility for security

in the Middle East generally.

Restoration of order in Malaya.

Maintenance of a world-wide system of garrisons and bases, e.g., Gibraltar, Malta, Persian Gulf, Singapore, Hag8ngf Hakland Islands and Caribbean.

8

1

3

Page 9. (c) Obligations arising from our International Position

Share This Page