CONFIDENTIAL
C. (52) 192
Printed for the Cabinet. June 1952
CABINET OFFICE RECORD COPY
Page 117
Copy No. 64
13th June, 1952
CABINET
THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN GERMANY
NOTE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
I circulate to my colleagues for information extracts from a record of an interesting conversation between Mr. F. K. Roberts, Deputy Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office in charge of German Affairs, and Herr Abs, head of the German delegation to the Debt Conference.
Foreign Office, S.W.1,
13th June, 1952.
A. E.
Herr Abs lunched with me to-day. He had just returned from Germany, where he had a long meeting with Dr. Adenauer yesterday. He gave me the following information about the political situation in Germany with special reference to the ratification of the Contract.
Dr. Adenauer is himself better and no longer has a temperature, but he is very tired and over-worked and rather preoccupied with internal developments. Much clearly depends upon the decision of the Constitutional Court on the petition now before it from the S.P.D. to declare that a two-thirds majority is necessary for ratification of the German Contract and E.D.C. Treaty. The Government hope that the Court will follow the practice of the American Supreme Court and declare itself incompetent to pronounce on a hypothetical question. In other words, the issue would only arise after the Bundestag has approved these instruments by a simple majority. The Chancellor's intention is that immediately this has happened President Heuss should himself approach the Constitutional Court and ask for a favourable opinion that it will then be within his powers to ratify these agreements as not being inconsistent with the basic law. Herr Abs had no very definite opinion on what would happen if the Constitutional Court failed to act in the above way. He told me he had discussed this with the Chancellor but the Chancellor's fixed policy was to refuse to discuss alternative courses of action so long as he was confident that the one on which he was engaged would succeed.
Herr Abs then told me that he had strongly advised the Chancellor to visit Berlin in the immediate future and to make a strong defence of the Contract and the E.D.C. Treaty from Berlin. This would weaken the Socialist opposition, since the Berlin Socialists were more in sympathy with the Chancellor's policy of firmness towards Russia than with Dr. Schumacher's negative policy. Herr Abs said that there was plenty of evidence that East Zone opinion was sympathetic to the Federal Government's policy and critical of the Schumacher line.
Herr Abs told me that the Secretary of State's visit to Berlin had made an immensely favourable impression throughout Germany, where British stock now stood very high. Not only the visit but the calm way in which it had been conducted Page 42300f 200
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had puck & freaction in Germany. I took the opportunity toPage laeof 200 the importance of placing orders in Berlin. He agreed that this was most important and said that steps were being taken. (This was also stated in yesterday's parliamentary debate on Berlin at Bonn.) We also discussed briefly Dr. Suhr's
visit to London next week. Herr Abs said he knew Dr. Suhr well and that we could rely on Dr. Suhr to avoid making any remarks at the Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting or elsewhere which could be interpreted by the Opposition as support for the Schumacher line.
Herr Abs then told me that he had tried to persuade Dr. Adenauer himself to take the initiative in going to the country and proposing fresh elections imme- diately on the basis of support for or rejection of the German Contract and the E.D.Č. Treaty. Herr Abs was convinced that the result would be very favourable to Dr. Adenauer, although there was clearly some element of risk. The Chancellor, however, had pointed out to him that he simply could not do this under the German Constitution. The Chancellor had no power to demand a dissolution. The Chancellor is, however, most anxious to get the ratification issue settled before October, since he feels that the German Parliament will then enter into a pre- electoral period and conduct of normal business would become difficult.
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We then discussed the need for the Chancellor to lessen his own burden. Herr Abs confirmed that it was the Chancellor's intention to relinquish the Foreign Ministry after the ratification was through. He told me that the Chancellor had offered him the post of Foreign Minister. He was very doubtful whether he should accept. His
liamentary Lece to the Chancellor had been to make Herr Brentano the Par-
liamentary Leader of the C.D.U., Foreign Minister. The Chancellor had, however, insisted that his offer to Herr Abs remained open although there was no need for any immediate decision to be taken.
I took the opportunity to cast a fly over Herr Abs about the line the Germans would wish us to take in reply to the latest Soviet Note. He told me that he had not discussed this yesterday with the Chancellor. His own feeling, however, which he was sure was shared by the great majority of Germans, was that the Western Powers should lean over backwards to avoid any possible reproach that they were preventing Four-Power talks. He thought we could quite safely meet the Russians now on the type of limited agenda suggested in our Note of 13th May. Dr. Rosen, the German Chargé d'Affaires, also expressed this view to me very emphatically this afternoon.
Foreign Office,
(Signed)
FRANK K. ROBERTS.
11th June, 1952.